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PRECLEARANCE UNDER SECTION FIVE OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
HIROSHI MOTOMURAt

Since 1965 the Voting Rights Act hasprovidedcrucialprotection
for the voting rights of minority citizens in jurisdictions covered by its
provisions.Section 5 of the Act requiresthat any changesin laws affecting voting must be submittedfor preclearance to either the United
States Attorney General or to the United States District Courtfor the
District of Columbia, over eight hundred such proposedchanges have
been blocked by the Attorney Generalor the district court as discriminatoryin purposeor effect. By examiningthe objection letters issued by
the Attorney General*andthe decisions of the district court, Professor
Motomura seeks to articulate and de6ne the contours of the analysis
used in section 5 preclearance determinations. This examination
reveals that the acceptabilityof at-large elections,changes in individual
balloting, annexations and consolidations, and redistricting is determined only in partby the "retrogression"test adoptedby the Supreme
Court in Beer v. United States. 4 criticalsupplement to the limited
analysis of the retrogressiontest isfound in considerationof thefactors
enunciatedin constitutionalvote dilution cases arisingunder the fourteenth andflfteenth amendments.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, amended by Congress in 1970, 1975, and
most recently in 1982,1 protects minority citizens' right to vote throughout the
United States. 2 In many parts of the country, the Act has been used to remove
t Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Colorado; B.A. 1974, Yale College; J.D. 1978, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California at Berkeley.
The author would like to thank Armand Derfner and Sara-Ann Determan for their encouragement and Clifford Calhoun, David Hunter, Howard Klemme, Steve Rotman, and Tina Stikas
for their comments on earlier drafts.
A substantial part of this article was written while the author was associated with the Washington, D.C. firm of Hogan & Hartson, which acted as counsel to the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights in connection with the extension of the Voting Rights Act in 1982. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the
Leadership Conference or its member organizations.
* This article cites § 5 correspondence by the name of the submitting jurisdiction and the
date of the letter.
1. For the legislative history of the 1982 amendments, see S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-4 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 177, 179-81; H.R. REP. No. 227,
97th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1976), as amended by Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131. See generally S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-9
(1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 177, 180-86; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-15 (1966); Bickerstaff, Reapportionment by State Legislatures: A Guidefor
the 1980's, 34 Sw. L.J. 607, 662-64 (1980); Derfner, RacialDiscriminationandthe Right to Vote, 26
VAND. L. REv. 523 (1973); Halpin & Engstrom, Racial Gerrymanderingand Southern State Legir-
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obstacles to voting and to correct unfair administration of the election process.
In many Southern states, for example, it has led to dramatic increases in registration, voting, and election of blacks to public office. 3 Elsewhere, the law has
helped to open the political process to participation by blacks, Hispanics, Na4
tive Americans, and Asian-Americans.
Of the Act's many provisions, section 5 has emerged as perhaps the most

important for the continuing protection of minority voting rights. Section 5
requires covered jurisdictions5 to submit any change in a law, practice, or procedure affecting voting to either the United States Attorney General or a
three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Co-

lumbia 6 for a ruling that the change does not have the purpose or effect of
discriminating against racial or language minorities. Thus, section 5 prevents
covered jurisdictions from changing election laws to erode the Act's ban on
literacy tests and other voting qualification devices, and from otherwise under7
mining the voting rights of minorities.

Under section 5, the covered jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a change does not have a discriminatory
purpose or effect. 8 This shift in the burden of proof, together with the creation
of an administrative preclearance procedure, gives effective protection to minority voters whose only remedy otherwise would be to litigate constitutional
lative Redistricting: Attorney GeneralDeterminationsUnder the Voting Rights Act, 22 J. Pun. L. 37,
46-48 (1973); Note, Section A- Growth or Demise ofStatutory Voting Rights?, 48 Miss. L.J. 818,
819-20 (1977).
3. See Bickerstaff, supra note 2, at 633-34; Derfner, supra note 2, at 551-52.
4. Persons of Spanish heritage, Alaskan natives, American Indians, and Asian-Americans
are the language minorities specifically designated for coverage. See S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 11, 31-32 (1975), reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 774, 797-98; Implementation of the Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Regarding Language Minority Groups, 28
C.F.R. § 55.1 (1981).
5. The basic coverage formula for § 5 is set forth in § 4(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)
(1976). The jurisdictions presently subject to the § 5 preclearance procedure are: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and parts of
California (4 counties), Colorado (I county), Connecticut (3 towns), Florida (5 counties), Hawaii
(Honolulu County), Idaho (I county), Massachusetts (9 towns), Michigan (2 townships), New
Hampshire (10 towns), New York (Bronx, Kings, and New York Counties), North Carolina (40
counties), South Dakota (2 counties), and Wyoming (1 county). Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (1981).
The 1982 amendments provide covered jurisdictions with the opportunity to remove themselves from coverage (i.e., to "bail out") if they can show: (1) a ten-year record of full compliance
with the Act, and (2) positive steps to afford full opportunity for minority participation in the
political process. These new bailout standards take effect on August 5, 1984. See S. REP. No. 417,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-62, 68-75 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. News 177,
221-41, 246-54.
6. Hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "district court."
7. See generally H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 10-11 (1965); S. REP. No. 162, pt.
3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 12 (1965); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334-35 (1966);
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548-49, 563-71 (1969); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452
U.S. 130, 149 (1981).
8. City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 1011 (D.D.C. 198 1), prob.jurs.
noted, 102 S. Ct. 1272 (1982). The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this change
in the burden of proof. See South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 335; City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156, 183 n.18 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 536-39 (1973). See also Hale
County v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (D.D.C. 1980); 28 C.F.R. § 51.39(e) (1981).
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claims based on the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 9

In view of the expense and delay involved in a declaratory judgment action in the district court,10 almost all covered jurisdictions first seek
preclearance for their changes from the Attorney General. I If the Attorney
General does not issue an objection letter12 within sixty days, the jurisdiction
may implement the change.' 3 An objection, however, blocks enforcement of
the change.' 4 A jurisdiction may modify and resubmit an objectionable
change, or it may seek a declaratory judgment in the district court that the
change is not discriminatory in purpose or effect.' 5 While the vast majority of
section 5 submissions receive "preclearance," the Attorney General has issued
over four hundred objections, which have prevented implementation of over
6
eight hundred changes affecting voting.'

As of this writing, there exists no comprehensive published analysis of the
substantive law of section

5.17

Courts, covered jurisdictions, interested citi-

9. See South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 310-15; S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982),
reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 177, 181-82; H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3-4 (1981). For a discussion of congressional efforts between 1957 and 1965 to facilitate
litigation under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, see Derfner, supra note 2, at 545-50.
10. One commentator has pointed out that while a submission to the Attorney General may
be less costly and time-consuming than a declaratory judgment action, approval by the Attorney
General will not bar a fourteenth or fifteenth amendment vote dilution action attacking the plan's
constitutionality. He suggests that jurisdictions may desire to litigate constitutionality as part of a
declaratory judgment action. Bickerstaff, supra note 2, at 672.
11. The Attorney General has delegated responsibility and authority for determinations
under § 5 to the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division. 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (1981).
12. The Attorney General notifies the submitting jurisdiction of his determination by letter
from the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, or his delegate, to the representative
of the submitting jurisdiction. Copies of these letters are included in the records kept on each § 5
submission and are available for inspection and copying. 28 C.F.R. § 51.49 (1981). The letters are
not reported. Derfner, supra note 2, at 580 n.246.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (1976). A change affecting voting that is precleared is still subject to
challenge, but "only in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality; there is no further remedy
provided by § 5." Allen, 393 U.S. at 549-50. See also South Carolina,383 U.S. at 325; Senate of
Cal. v. Smith, No. 81-2767 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1982) (order denying motion to intervene); Apache
County v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903, 906-07 (D.D.C. 1966).
14. 28 C.F.R. § 51.43 (1981).
15. Although the distict court undertakes its own de novo § 5 inquiry, courts have stated
repeatedly that they will accord some deference to the prior determination of the Attorney General as the officer who administers the statute. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 175
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 391 (1971); City of
Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp 1021, 1031 (D.D.C. 1972) (per curiam), aj'd, 410 U.S.
962 (1973).
The Attorney General has stated:
In the conduct of our preclearance function under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, we
traditionally have considered ourselves to be a surrogate of the district court, seeking to
make the kind of decision we believe the court would make if the matter were before it.
In that role, therefore, as well as in our role as party to that lawsuit, we are bound by the
district court's decision.
Objection letter to Port Arthur, Tex. (Mar. 12, 1982). See also 28 C.F.R. § 51.39(a) (1981).
16. H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1981).
17. Partial treatments of the substantive law of § 5 are D. HUNTER, FEDERAL REviEw OF
VOTING CHANGES: How To USE SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 20-32 (2d ed. 1975);
Bickerstaff, supra note 2, at 667-69; Halpin & Engstrom, supra note 2, at 49-65; Note, supra note 2,
at 822-25; Note, "DiscriminatoryPurpose," "Changes," and "Dilution": Recent JudicialInterpretations of§ 5 ofthe Voting Rights Act, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 333 (1975).
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zens, and even the Department of Justice lack guidance in determining how a
particular covered change should be decided under section 5. Objection letters
do not cite other objection letters or make any apparent effort to create an
independent body of section 5 law based on precedent. As a result, the process
runs a significant risk of inconsistent or haphazard adjudication.
This article attempts to discover, articulate, and analyze the principles of
law that have governed the administration of section 5 by the Attorney General and the district court.18 In so doing, the article attempts to provide a
guide so that future section 5 determinations may be made with a greater
awareness of the scheme that has emerged over time.
In part, the attainment of this goal is limited by the shortcomings of the
objection letters as source materials. In contrast to judicial opinions in section
5 declaratory judgment actions, the Attorney General's objection letters often
fail to impart complete information about a submission's factual context. The
text of a typical objection letter begins with a brief description of the proposed
change, recites the background facts that relate directly to the objection, and
proceeds swiftly to its conclusion that the proposed change will have a discriminatory purpose or effect. The "analysis" in the typical letter is limited to
general references to several of the key constitutional vote dilution cases.1 9
Because the objection letters have not taken other objection letters into account in any deliberate effort to construct an analytical matrix, the task of
ordering them sometimes resembles empirical investigation more than it does
traditional legal research.
Fortunately, several aspects of the objections help make analysis possible.
First, although they do not cite each other, the letters frequently refer to constitutional vote dilution cases as a concise way of invoking legal principles that
have been developed in those cases. Second, decisions in section 5 declaratory
judgment actions are considerably more complete than the objection letters
and provide a rough outline by which the objection letters themselves may be
ordered. And most importantly, the sheer number of objection letters allows
the observer to discern general patterns. Taken together, these patterns constitute the substantive law of section 5.
The article begins with a general discussion in Part II of the statute's discriminatory "purpose or effect" standard, which the Attorney General and the
district court must apply to each section 5 submission and declaratory judg18. This article considers § 5 activity by the district court and the Attorney General through
August 31, 1982.
This article does not attempt a comprehensive discussion of either the scope of § 5 coverage
or enforcement of § 5. For discussion of these areas, see H. BALL, D. KRANE & T. LAUTH, COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT (1982); Engstrom,
Racial Vote Dilution: Supreme Court InterpretationsofSection 5 ofthe Voting Rights Act, 4 S.U.L.
REV. 139 '(1978); D. HUNTER, supra note 17, at 10-19, 33-39; MacCoon, The Enforcement of the
PreclearanceRequirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 107
(1979); Roman, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Formation of an ExtraordinaryFederal
Remedy, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 111 (1972); Slawsky, A Local Government's Guide to Section 5 of the
Voting RlghtsAct, 12 URB. LAW. 700 (1980).
19. H. BALL, D. KRANE & T. LAUTH, supra note 18, at 73-94, describes the internal Department of Justice procedures for examining submissions.
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ment action. The key case in defining discriminatory purpose or effect is the
1976 Supreme Court decision in Beer v. United States.20 Under Beer, a
change subject to section 5 warrants preclearance if it meets two conditions.
First, under the "retrogression" test, it must enhance or leave unchanged the
must not discrimicurrent electoral position of minorities. Second, the change
2
nate against minorities in violation of the Constitution. '
A central thesis of this article is that the retrogression test in Beer has
been a slippery and unpredictable analytical tool that has had limited influence on the development of the substantive law of section 5. In support of this
thesis, the article discusses the major types of court decisions and objection
letters under section 5. Part III discusses section 5 submissions concerning
voter registration procedures, polling place changes, and other changes affecting the individual vote. The article then turns to questions of vote dilution,
first by discussing in Part IV at-large elections and election laws designed to
prevent minority voters from concentrating support to elect one candidate of
their choice. Part V discusses the special type of voting dilution that occurs
when an annexation or consolidation changes the racial or ethnic composition
of a jurisdiction. Finally, Part VI discusses another type of vote dilutiondiscriminatory redistricting.
The article concludes that the retrogression test in Beer does not provide a
reliable guide to the growing body of section 5 law. While the courts and the
Attorney General have generally remained faithful to the dictates of the test,
they also have been forced to struggle with its limitations. The test has compelled decision-makers to define the "status quo" in the context of specific
submissions, but has not preempted constitutional standards. Conceding the
difficulties inherent in the inquiry into retrogression, and accepting the invitation in Beer itself to consider issues relating to constitutionality, the courts and
the Attorney General have freely incorporated vote dilution indicators relevant to analysis under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments into the jurisprudence of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
II.

BEER v

UNITED STATES

Beer v. UnitedStatesz2 involved the redistricting of the New Orleans City
Council. The 1954 city charter had provided for a seven-member council,
with one member being elected from each of five districts and two being
elected by the voters of the city at large. In 1961 the city redistricted on the
basis of the 1960 census. In one district, blacks constituted a majority of the
population but only half of the registered voters. In four other districts white
voters clearly outnumbered black voters. No black won election to the council
from 1960 to 1970. After the 1970 census, the council devised a redistricting
20. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
21. Id. at 141.
22. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). See generally Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Due Process-Non-retrogressiveReapportionment Plan Upheld, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 173 (1976).
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plan that provided for black population majorities in two districts but a black
voter majority in only one district.
When the city submitted this plan to the Attorney General for
preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Attorney General
objected on several grounds. The boundaries of the districts, he stated, "appear. . . to dilute black voting strength by combining a number of black voters with a larger number of white voters in each of the five districts. '23 He
added that "it does not appear that the district. lines are drawn as they are
because of any compelling governmental need," and that the lines "do not
reflect numeric population configurations or considerations of district compactness or regularity of shape." 24 The city submitted a revised plan, to which
the Attorney General again objected. This second objection raised essentially
the same grounds as the first, with the additional point that the .revised plan
had districts running north-south while the city's25predominantly black neighborhoods were located in an east-west direction.
At that point, the city turned to the district court for a declaratory judgment that its revised plan did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect. The
district court examined the plans and concluded that they diluted the black
vote impermissibly in light of the fragmentation of black communities, the
availability of alternative plans, and the history of racial discrimination in
New Orleans. 26 While the district court recognized that the predictable failure
of blacks under the proposed plan to elect representatives in proportion to
their numbers did not in itself indicate impermissible vote dilution, it relied in
part on the disparity between black population and black27representation to
conclude that the plan "minimized" black voting strength.
The Supreme Court reversed, and in so doing sought to announce the
general standards that govern the determination of when a change covered by
section 5 should receive preclearance. 28 Beer held that a section 5 submission
must be approved if it meets two requirements. Under the first prong of Beer,
the "retrogression test," the change must enhance or leave unchanged the position of "minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise." 2 9 Second, the change must not otherwise discriminate30on the basis
of race or ethnic group so as to violate constitutional standards.
Thus, under the retrogression test a change does not have a discrimina23. Objection letter to New Orleans, La. (Jan. 15, 1973).
24. Id.
25. Objection letter to New Orleans, La. (July 9, 1973).
26. Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 385-99 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
As a separate and independent ground for objection, the district court held that the failure of the
plan to alter the city charter provision establishing two at-large seats had in itself an impermissible
discriminatory effect. Id at 399-402.
27. Id. at 389-90.

28. 425 U.S. at 139-42.
29. Id at 141.
30. Id. With regard to constitutionality, the Court stated that the plan did not "remotely

approach" a violation of the constitutional standards enunciated in the vote dilution cases that the
Court had decided up to that date. See id at 142-43 n.14.
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tory "effect" if minorities are equally well off or better off after the change
than before it, even if the change leaves undisturbed a status quo that still does
not fairly reflect minority voting strength. The majority of the Court reasoned
that "the purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting procedure
changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of
racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise." 3' Applying this standard to the facts in Beer, the Court noted that
under the 1961 redistricting none of the five districts had a clear black voter
majority, and no blacks had been elected to the City Council. The proposed
plan contained two districts in which blacks constituted a majority of the population. In one of those districts, blacks constituted a majority of the registered voters. In view of this enhancing effect, as compared with the plan
previously in force, the Court concluded that the plan would have no discrimiand did not even consider the issue of vote dilution in the submitnatory effect
32
ted plan.
Beer's "retrogression" standard has proved unwieldy in practice even
though it appears straightforwaid it first glance. As a general standard for
section 5, the "retrogression test" contains several inherent limitations. The
struggle with these limitations has been a recurring theme in the district court's
and the Attorney General's approach to each type of change covered by section 5. The district court and the Attorney General have responded by slowly
developing the view that the section 5 cases are best addressed by considering
the same factors that have dominated constitutional vote dilution cases. While
the remainder of this article will discuss the standards that have evolved with
respect to various types of submitted changes, a few general comments on Beer
are in order by way of introduction.
One limitation of Beer's retrogression test is its requirement that the decision-maker ascertain a status quo with which to compare the submitted
34
change.33 Beer itself used a preexisting apportionment plan as a benchmark.
Defining the "status quo," however, has often proved to be difficult task, and
inmany cases the status quo has been a hypothetical35ideal plan rather than the
actual existing regime that Beer appears to require.
A second limitation of Beer's retrogression test arises from the Supreme
Court's use of the term "retrogression" to define discriminatory "effect" as a
statutory term of art under section 5.36 The second prong of Beer, however,
further provides that a change, even if it is not "retrogressive," still violates
section 5 if it discriminates so as to be unconstitutional. 3 7 Because section 5
31. Id at 141.
32. Id. at 141-42.
33. See Apache County High School Dist. v. United States, No. 77-1518, slip op. at 11-12
(D.D.C. June 12, 1980), discussed in greater detail infra text accompanying notes 98-102.
34. 425 U.S. at 141-42.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 138-41, 179-89, 256-61, 319-25.
36. 425 U.S. at 139.
37. Id. at 141.
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places the burden of proof on the submitting jurisdiction, 38 a jurisdiction making a submission under section 5 may be unable to show that the change meets
the standard of constitutionality, even when that same jurisdiction could withstand a constitutional claim with respect to the same practice in standard vote
dilution litigation.
In response to the limitations of the retrogression test, and to Beer's invitation to consider constitutional standards, the district court and the Attorney
General have relied on constitutional vote dilution cases as guides to analysis.
While the burden of proof under section 5 and the Constitution differ,39 the
two groups of cases consider and rely on many of the same basic factors. This
article attempts to demonstrate that the constitutional law of vote dilution,
rather than the retrogression test, offers a more reliable guide to the substantive principles that have developed under section 5.40
In deciding these constitutional vote dilution cases, courts repeatedly have
begun with the principle that there is no constitutional right to proportional
representation as such.4 ' Even consistent defeat at the polls is insufficient by
itself to show vote dilution. 42 Beyond this starting point, vote dilution cases
38. The submitting jurisdiction has the burden of proving both nonretrogression and consti-

tutionality. Eg., objection letters to Selma, Ala. (Apr. 28, 1980); Medina County, Tex. (Dec. 11,
1979).
39. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
40. These judicial efforts define the qualitativedimensions of the constitutional right to vote.
In Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 215-16 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980), the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted the need to distinguish vote dilution cases from the traditional
"one person, one vote" inquiry as exemplified by Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Vote
dilution cases concern the "qualitative" aspect of the right to vote: For a summary of the Supreme
Court's shift of focus from the early quantitative reapportionment cases to the qualitative questions of "vote dilution," see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 737-50 (1978).

41. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971), the Supreme Court held the multimember district system in Marion County, Indiana did not violate the fourteenth amendment
even though disproportionately fewer blacks had won election to public office. In White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-67 (1972), the Supreme Court held that multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties, Texas unconstitutionally diluted the votes of blacks and Mexican-Americans.
In both cases, the Court stated that no racial or ethnic group has a constitutional right to elect
representatives in proportion to its numerical voting power in the community. White, 412 U.S. at
765-66; J¢hitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149-50. A minority group may find itself outvoted and without
legislative seats of its own, but this situation alone provides no basis for a constitutional remedy
when the minority group is not being denied political access. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 154-55.
Accord Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3276 (1982), a.rg Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th
Cir. 1981); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 77-80 (1980); City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U.S. 358, 370-72 (1975); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977); Gilbert v. Sterrett, 509 F.2d 1389, 1394 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975); Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1973); Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), a9'd on othergroundsper curiam sub
nonm East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Howard v. Adams County
Bd. of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455, 458 (5th Cir.), ceri. denied,407 U.S. 925 (1972); Mississippi v.
United States, 490 F. Supp. 569, 582 (D.D.C. 1979), aft'd, 444 U.S. 1050 (1980).
A legislature may consider race and proportionality of representation in formulating a redistricting plan, especially when the purpose is to comply with § 5. UnitedJewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at
159-61, 165-67. It is an abuse of discretion, however, for a court to formulate a plan to achieve
proportional representation by race. Zimmer v. Edwards, 629 F.2d 425, 426 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied sub nonz, Marshall v. East Carroll Parish Police Jury, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); Marshall v.
Edwards, 582 F.2d 927, 934-38 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979).
42. See, ag., Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d at 1362; Neveit, 571 F.2d at 216.
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have turned on several recurring issues. 4 3 First, a key factor has been racially
polarized voting, without which vote dilution along racial or ethnic lines could
not occur.44 Second, courts have considered any history of racial discrimination, both in general and in matters affecting voting, 45 because past discrimi46
nation has lingering adverse effects on minority political participation.
Third, chronic failure of minority candidates to win election, in conjunction
with other factors, may indicate vote dilution. 4 7 Fourth, evidence of low minority participation in candidate selection or minimal access to other political
processes has also been considered. 48 Finally, some courts have noted that the
low socio-economic status of a minority group may decrease its level of political participation. 49 These factors, taken cumulatively, have provided the
framework for analyzing a submission under section 5.50
43. This article, here and infra text accompanying notes 106-26, summarizes the factors that
have emerged as critical in fourteenth and fifteenth amendment vote dilution cases, but it does not
attempt to analyze those cases exhaustively. See generally Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3275-78;
Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1981); Leadership Roundtable v. City of Little Rock,
499 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Ark. 1980), aj'dpercuriam, 661 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. 1981); Bickerstaff, supra
note 2, at 644-57.
44. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3279; City of Petersburg,354 F. Supp. at 1025-26;
Neveti, 571 F.2d at 223. See also UnitedJewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 166 n.24.
Racially polarized voting, or racial bloc voting, has been defined as the propensity of voters,
when presented with candidates of different races, to vote for the candidate of their own race.
Hale County, 496 F. Supp. at 1212-13; City of Rome v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 226
(D.D.C. 1979), ajf'd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
45. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3279-80; White, 412 U.S. at 766-67; Lodge v.
Buxton, 639 F.2d at 1377-78; Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1979); Kirksey, 554 F.2d
at 143; Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 1974); Turner, 490 F.2d at
194.
46. See Hale County, 496 F. Supp. at 1216-17.
"Where ... there is a history of 'sweeping and persuasive' past discrimination and a present
disproportion in minority electoral participation, the plaintiffs [in a § 5 declaratory judgment action] have the burden of showing that the past discrimination no longer affects present voting
patterns." Id. at 1216 (citing McIntosh County Branch of the NAACP v. City of Darien, 605 F.2d
753, 759 (5th Cir. 1979)). See also Kirklsey, 554 F.2d at 146; Wilkes County v. United States, 450
F. Supp. 1171, 1176 (D.D.C.), af'd, 439 U.S. 999 (1978).
47. E.g., White, 412 U.S. at 766-67; McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1248 n.18
(5th Cir.), appeal dismissed sub nom. City of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 453 U.S. 946 (1981); Kirksey,
554 F.2d at 143; Robinson, 505 F.2d at 679. Nonetheless, election of minority candidates does not
necessarily indicate equal access to the political process. United States v. Board of Supervisors,
571 F.2d 951, 956 (5th Cir. 1978); Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 149 n.21.
48. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3279-80; Cross, 604 F.2d at 878; Nevett, 571 F.2d at
223; Turner, 490 F.2d at 194.
49. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3280; White, 412 U.S. at 766-67; Lodge v. Buxton, 639
F.2d at 1378-79; Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 143, 145.
50. See also BoardofSupervisors, 571 F.2d at 954; Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265, 1268-71
(5th Cir. 1977); David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1977); Leadership Roundtable, 499 F.
Supp. at 584-92. Evidence on these factors was conspicuously absent in Whitcomb. See 403 U.S.
at 134-37, 149-53.
Responsiveness of white elected officials to the minority community is another factor that
constitutional cases often have considered. See, eg., Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d at 1375-77; Cross,
604 F.2d at 878; Nevett, 571 F.2d at 223; Turner, 490 F.2d at 194. While responsiveness has been
considered in evaluating the local context of a § 5 submission, see City ofPetersburg,354 F. Supp.
at 1026, responsiveness is probably less significant, and perhaps even misleading, when objective
effect is at issue.
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III. THE INDIVIDUAL BALLOT
Changes affecting voter registration, polling places, and other aspects of
casting the individual ballot are basic to voting rights and thus to section 5
protections. Political participation assumes the individual vote; unless the vote
is cast, it is pointless to consider more complex questions such as whether that
vote is effective or has been diluted.
The district court and the Attorney General have approached this group
of changes by asking first whether a submission has a demonstrably disproportionate impact on minorities. In this situation, the district court and the Attorney General have recognized that minorities have had chronically low rates of
voter registration and turnout, largely because of past discrimination. 5' Even
when evidence of past discrimination is not clear, any change that makes it
has been regarded as havmore difficult for an individual to register and vote
52
ing a probable disparate impact on minorities.
A.

Voter Registration

The Attorney General has objected to changes that hinder registration of
minority voters or remove them from the rolls in a discriminatory manner.
These practices generally have fallen into three categories: (1) dual registraIn addition, several obtion, (2) reregistration, and (3) registration 5methods.
3
jections have blocked hidden literacy tests.
"Dual registration" refers to the requirement that voters must register
twice-once for county, state, and federal elections, and again for municipal
elections. The Attorney General objected, for example, to dual registration in
Alapaha, Georgia. The requirement's apparent purpose was to curtail minority voting in response to the election of the city's first minority council member.54 Similarly, the Attorney General has objected when the municipal
registration would not make use of deputy registrars who had been instrumental in registering black voters at the county level.55
Purging voter lists, and thus requiring reregistration, also can discriminate against minorities. A reregistration requirement often neutralizes a regis51. For example, the district court has stated:
The effect of Mississippi's past history of racial discrimination in voting and other
areas continues to affect black people in many portions of the state today, which has
resulted in a generally lower participation by blacks than whites in the political process.
Consequently, proportionally fewer blacks are registered to vote than whites, and black
voters turn out at the polls at a lower rate than white voters.
Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D.D.C. 1979), aft'd, 444 U.S. 1050 (1980). See
also objection letters to Wilcox County, Ala. (Oct. 26, 1981); Perry County, Ala. (Sept. 25, 1981).
Minority opposition to the submitted changes supports an inference of discriminatory purpose or
effect. Objection letter to Wilcox County, Ala. (Oct. 26, 1981).
52. E.g., objection letters to the State of Georgia (Sept. 18, 1981); State of Mississippi (Apr. 6,
1981).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 65-67.
54. Objection letter to Alapaha, Ga. (Mar. 24, 1980).
55. Objection letter to Stockbridge, Ga. (May 9, 1975).
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tration campaign that registered minority voters at great effort and expense. 56
reregistration statistics will show how
When reregistration has actually begun, 57
the requirement has affected minorities.
In situations in which the reregistration has not yet been implemented,
the Attorney General has considered several factors in assessing the discriminatory potential of a reregistration proposal. An objection will issue if voters
"were not provided adequate notice and opportunity to reregister." 58 In Jasper County, Mississippi the only publicity was through the county newspaper.
There were no radio announcements, personal contacts, direct mailings, or any
other efforts to reach voters who did not or could not read the newspaper. In
addition, the newspaper notice was misleading because it implied that voters
could reregister only at certain restricted times and places, and that they had
to submit a legal description of the property on which they lived. 59 The Attorney General objected to mandatory reregistration in Lee County, Mississippi
because voters had not been notified that they needed to reregister. 60 Similar
lack of notice prompted an objection in 1981 to a reregistation requirement for
the State of Mississippi. 61 The Attorney General also has examined the reregistration procedure. For example, Lee County, Mississippi restricted courthouse reregistration to regular working hours and a limited number of
Saturdays; plans for more convenient reregistration were uncertain. Blacks
had not been involved in formulating the plan, there were no black deputy
registrars, and blacks were not62"in any other way intended to be involved in
the conduct of reregistration."
Other registration objections concern changes in ongoing registration
methods. In 1981 the Attorney General objected to the State of Georgia's proposal that all voter registration applications be required to furnish "proper
identification" in order to register. Because individual registrars would have
wide discretion to determine what identification would be "proper," the State
failed to meet its burden of6 3proving that the requirement would not have a
disparate impact on blacks.
56. Section 6 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973d (1976), authorizes the appointment

of federal examiners to register voters when there are indications of discrimination in the local
registration process. The proposed reregistration in Jasper County, Mississippi would have

purged over 650 federally registered voters. Entirely apart from § 5 preclearance, "the removal of
such voters from voting lists, even though pursuant to a reregistration, cannot be accomplished
except as provided by pertinent federal regulations." Objection letter to Jasper County, Miss.
(June 8, 1971). See also objection letter to Wilcox County, Ala. (Oct. 26, 1981); Sumter County,
Ala. (Oct. 2, 1981); Perry County, Ala. (Sept. 25, 1981).
57. See objection letter to Jasper County, Miss. (June 8, 1971).
58. Id
59. Id
60. Objection letter to Lee County, Miss. (Apr. 4, 1977).
61. Objection letter to the State of Mississippi (Apr. 6, 1981).
62. Objection letter to Lee County, Miss. (Apr. 4, 1977). Objecting to another reregistration
requirement, the Attorney General cited the "limited hours and locations at which reidentification
can be accomplished, and the generally restrictive manner in which one would have to go about

perfecting his or her reidentification." Objection letter to Perry County, Ala. (Sept. 25, 1981).
63. Objection letter to the State of Georgia (Sept. 18, 1981). The Attorney General recently
withdrew this objection after the State Elections Board issued an official list of forms of identifica-

tion. Letter to the State of Georgia (July 26, 1982).
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A 1980 case involved an attempt by DeKalb County, Georgia, to outlaw
neighborhood voter registration drives, which had been successful in registering black voters. The county's registered voters included only twenty-four
percent of the black voting age population, as contrasted to eighty-one percent
of the white voting age population. Blacks constituted thirty-two percent of
the voting age population, but only thirteen percent of the county's registered
64
voters.
Section 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act expressly prohibits the use of literacy tests, tests of "good moral character," or any similar "test or device" as a
prerequisite to registation or voting.65 On several occasions, the Attorney
General has objected to hidden literacy tests or any similar prohibited "test or
device." For example, an amendment to the North Carolina Constitution
would have required voters to be able to read or write any section of the Constitution in the English language. 66 The Attorney General also objected to a
North Carolina statute that would have required those registering to vote to
make a "written" and "signed" statement. 67
The Attorney General has acknowledged, however, that administrative
.considerations may justify some proposals that affect the registration process.
Accordingly, preclearance may be granted when the jurisdiction tries to minimize discriminatory impact. For example, the Attorney General offered to
reconsider his objection to registration in Lee County, Mississippi if the county
made the procedure more "convenient and accessible to the minority community."' 68 A 1981 objection to a reregistration program in Sumter County, Alabama gave a list of alternative procedures that the Attorney General would
find "tentatively" acceptable. 69 Similarly, the Attorney General approved a
series of Mississippi reregistrations on the condition that voters on the old rolls
be allowed to vote in the next elections. 70 The Attorney General also has
stated that he would preclear dual registration in some circumstances. For example, he offered to approve a dual registration requirement if it applied only
to future registration and included "an accommqdation to the black community at least comparable to that in the existing system. . . ."71
Conversely, the Attorney General has objected when a jurisdiction has
adopted registration procedures that are more restrictive than necessary to accomplish adminstrative goals. 72 In general, the jurisdiction must adopt an al64. Objection letter to DeKalb County, Ga. (Sept. 11, 1980). More recently, the Attorney
General objected to DeKalb County's effort to restrict neighborhood voter registration drives to
even-numbered years. Objection letter to DeKalb County, Ga. (Mar. 5, 1982).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1976).
66. Objection letter to the State of North Carolina (Mar. 18, 1971).
67. Objection letter to the State of North Carolina (Apr. 20, 1971).
68. Objection letter to Lee County, Miss. (Apr. 4, 1977). The Attorney General has made
similar offers in objections to other reregistration requirements. Objection letters to Wilcox
County, Ala. (Oct. 26, 1981); Perry County, Ala. (Sept. 25, 1981).
69. Objection letter to Sumter County, Ala. (Oct. 2, 1981).
70. See WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT 25-30 (1972).
71. Objection letter to Stockbridge, Ga. (May 9, 1975).
72. See objection letters to Wilcox County, Ala. (Oct. 26, 1981); Perry County, Ala. (Sept. 25,
1981).
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effect and must
ternative that eliminates or minimizes any discriminatory
73

show that the change furthers a compelling state interest.
B.

Polling Place Changes

In Perkins v. Matthews74 the Supreme Court held that section 5 requires
preclearance of any changes in the location of polling places. Such changes

may be discriminatory if the proposed location is intimidating or inconvenient
for minority voters, or if there is inadequate notice of the change to
75
minorities.
With respect to intimidating location, the Attorney General has blocked

several attempts to transfer polling places to all-white clubs or other sites that
could be expected to reduce minority turnout. For example, Lafayette

County, Mississippi proposed to move a polling place to an all-white private

academy, 76 and St. Landry Parish, Louisiana tried to move a polling place to

the all-white Knights of Columbus hall. 77 The Attorney General also has objected to moving a polling place to a meeting hall owned by two all-white
an attempt to move a
private organizations. 78 Similarly, an objection blocked
79
polling place to the local American Legion hall.
The absence of minority officials at the new polling place may exacerbate
intimidating
effect that may exist.8 0 For this reason, the Attorney General
any
based one objection to a polling place change on evidence that election day
activities at the new site had been "threatening and intimidating to black
citizens." 8

Most polling place objections are based not on outright intimidation, but
rather on an inconvenient location that will disproportionately affect minority
73. Objecting to statewide registration in Texas, the Attorney General stated:
We also have closely scrutinized the nature of the State's interest in implementing a
statewide purge to determine whether it is compelling and whether alternative means of
accomplishing its purpose are available. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Under
all the circumstances involved, we are unable to conclude that a total purge is necessary
to achieve the State's purpose. Likewise, we are unable to conclude, as we must under
the Voting Rights Act, that implementation of such a purge in Texas will not have the
effect of discriminating on account of race or color and language minority status.
Objection letter to the State of Texas (Dec. 10, 1975).
74. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
75. Id. at 387-88.
76. Objection letter to Lafayette County, Miss. (July 16, 1971).
77. Objection letter to St. Landry Parish, La. (Dec. 6, 1972).
78. Objection letter to Kingsland, Ga. (Aug. 4, 1978).
79. Objection letter to Raymondville, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Mar. 25, 1977).
Objections have been interposed when the intimidation of minority voters was not obvious
but was still a significant potential danger. For example, the Attorney General objected to a
polling place change in the Southwest Texas Joint County Junior College District because "Mexican-Americans are generally less familiar with the Agricultural Exposition Building than with the
S and L Building and feel less welcome there." Objection letter to Southwest Texas Joint County
Junior College District (Mar. 24, 1978). In Warren County, Mississippi, an objection blocked a
change to a location in a white residential area that could be expected to inhibit minority turnout.
Objection letter to Warren County, Miss. (June 16, 1975).
80. E.g., objection letter to Kingsland, Ga. (Aug. 4, 1978).
81. Objection letter to Pointe Coupee Parish, La. (Oct. 20, 1978) (withdrawn Oct. 10, 1980).
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voters. Often, proposed polling places are significantly closer to white residential areas than to minority areas. In New York City, "the Board of Elections
had made a practice of locating polling places in the 63rd Assembly District in
large, predominantly white housing projects but had failed to located polling
places in minority housing projects of comparable size." 82 A 1981 objection
blocked a reduction in the number of polling places for.the Burleson County
Hospital District in Burleson County, Texas.8 3 The district had reduced the
number of polling places from thirteen to one, and voter turnout had dropped
from 2300 to 300. The single remaining location was located thirty miles from
the predominantly black part of the district and about nineteen miles from the
area. Similar examples of discriminatory
predominantly Mexican-American
84
polling place changes are legion.
In other situations, the discriminatory effect may be less obvious. The
practical inconvenience may burden minority voters disproportionately because they depend more on public transportation. For example, a polling
place change in Jones County, Georgia would have required "a significant
number" of voters to travel an additional three and one-half miles.8 5 The
Attorney General objected to a polling place change in Martinsville, Virginia
because "the substantial increase in distance of more than a mile, plus the
existence of a main thoroughfare which would bisect the consolidated precinct, would make walking to the polls, as in the past, a significant but apparently unnecessary hardship for many persons in that precinct. '8 6 The
Attorney General objected to a polling place change in New Orleans for similar reasons:
we understand that the new polling place is located approximately 16
82. Objection letter to New York, N.Y. (Dec. 13, 1976). See also Coalition for Educ. v.
Board of Elections, 370 F. Supp. 42 (S.D.N.Y.), aI'd,495 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1974); objection letter
to New York, N.Y. (Sept. 3, 1974).
83. Objection letter to Burleson County, Tex. (June 5, 1981).
84. See, e.g., objection letter to Harris County, Tex. (Mar. 1, 1978). The proposed polling site

would have been several miles from a heavy concentration of minority population without access
to public transportation. Those minority voters, many elderly, would have had to cross a freeway
that had no pedestrian overpass. Id.
In Wilson County, Texas, "the new polling place would be approximately one and one-half
miles from the present polling place,. . . there is no public transportation to the proposed polling
place, and. . . the present site is located in close proximity to a heavily minority populated area
and is within walking distance to a great majority of the minority registered voters in that precinct." Objection letter to Wilson County, Tex. (Nov. 4, 1980).
In Taylor, Texas a centrally located site was to be replaced by a site in a predominantly white
area at a "signifiant inconvenience" to minority voters. Objection letter to Taylor, Tex. (Dec. 3,
1979).
In Clay County, Mississippi the only polling places would be in the western part of the City
of West Point, where most of the white population lived. The proposed sites were five to ten miles
from certain predominantly black rural areas. Objection letter to Clay County, Miss. (July 25,
1975). See also objection letters to Ft. Bend County, Tex. (May 2, 1977); Newport News, Va. (May
17, 1974).
85. Objection letter to Jones County, Ga. (Aug. 12, 1974).
86. Objection letter to Martinsville, Va. (Apr. 19, 1974). See also objection letters to Pointe
Coupee Parish, La. (Aug. 11, 1978 & Oct. 20, 1978); New Orleans, La. (May 12, 1978). One
proposed polling place was located outside the precinct that it was intended to serve. Objection
letter to New Orleans, La. (July 17, 1973).
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blocks from the old polling place, that voters, many of whom are
elderly, would have to cross an interstate highway approximately 170
feet wide to reach the new polling place, and that many voters do not
and no convenient public transportation is
have automobiles
87
available.
In a more unusual case, the Attorney General objected to a polling place
change in Albany, Georgia that would have required a "substantial concentration" of black voters to vote on the same day in two polling places, one for

county and one for city elections."8

Inadequate notice has been recognized as another justification for objec-

tions to polling place changes. 8 9 The Attorney General's treatment of a polling place change in San Antonio, Texas suggests that adequacy of notice
depends on (1)actual means of notice, (2) prior familiarity of voters with the
proposed site, and (3) actual turnout. 90 Objections based on inadequate notice

have been filed most frequently when the adverse effect on minority voters was
reasonable to infer. For example, the Attorney General objected to a lastminute polling place change for a ninety-two percent black precinct in New
Orleans because the city had known for six months that the existing site would

not be suitable for polling. 9 ' The Attorney General objected to a polling place
change in Marshall County, Mississippi because "a substantial number of
votes were not placed in their'92proper precincts for the November election and
...this has a racial effect."
An objection to a polling place change has been even more likely if an
adequate alternative site is available, because the jurisdiction's rejection of
these alternatives may evidence a discriminatory effect. 93 In one objection let87. Objection letter to New Orleans, La. (May 12, 1978). Other objections based specifically
on the lack of public transportation include objection letters to Wilson County, Tex. (Nov. 4,
1980); Harris County, Tex. (Mar. 1, 1978); Ft. Bend County, Tex. (May 2, 1977); Warren County,
Miss. (June 16, 1975); Newport News, Va. (May 17, 1974).
88. Objection letter to Albany, Ga. (Nov. 16, 1971). See also objection letter to Albany, Ga.
(Jan. 7, 1972). The Attorney General also objected when Harris County, Texas changed school
elections so that voters in predominantly minority areas would have fewer polling places for the
same number of voters as white areas. Letters to Harris County, Tex. (May 28, 1980 & Sept. 1,
1978); objection letters to Harris County, Tex. (Jan. 17, 1980 & May 1, 1978).
89. Eg., objection letters to San Antonio, Tex. (Aug. 17, 1979); Harris County, Tex. (Mar. 1,
1978); Ft. Bend County, Tex. (May 2, 1977); Webster County, Ga. (Dec. 12, 1968).
90. See letter to San Antonio, Tex. (Mar. 24, 1980) (withdrawing objection of Aug. 17, 1979).
Upon reconsideration, the Attorney General withdrew his original objection to a proposed polling
place change with the following explanation:
You have demonstrated that notice of the exact location of the polling place for Precinct
205 was published bilingually in two newspapers serving San Antonio, and that signs
indicating alternate routes of access to the polling place were situated at several locations
on election day. Furthermore, your random survey of voters in Precinct 205 has demonstrated that voters were generally familiar with the campus of Our Lady of the Lake
University and the alternate routes of access to the polling place other than those
blocked by construction on 24th Street. You have also presented information which
shows that the voter turnout in Precinct 205 was not significantly different from that in
comparable precincts during the May 7, 1979 municipal elections.

.1d
91. Objection letter to New Orleans, La. (May 12, 1978).
92. Objection letter to Marshall County, Miss. (Dec. 3, 1971).
93. See objection letters to Taylor, Tex. (Dec. 3, 1979); Pointe Coupee Parish, La. (Oct. 20,
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ter, in fact, the Attorney General came very close to suggesting that the
94
county's rejection of available alternative sites evidenced invidious purpose.
By the same token, a jurisdiction may adopt alternative voting procedures
to compensate for the objectionable features of a proposed new site. For example, the Apache County, Arizona, High School District closed fifteen polling places on the local Navajo reservation for a special election in 1980.
Although the Attorney General objected because "those polling place changes
imposed a greater burden upon Navajo than upon white voters," he also
stated, "[O]ur analysis suggests that effective Navajo-language oral publicity
regarding absentee voting oportunities, coupled with the implementation of a
multilingual absentee voting procedure that addressed the special needs of the
Navajo language minority, could have alleviated the burden imposed by the
polling place reductions. '95 Several months later, the Attorney General withdrew the objection because 96
absentee voting procedures had received sufficient
Navajo-language publicity.
C. The IndividualBallot andthe Retrogression Test
The analysis involved in registration and polling place objections remains
relatively simple despite their fundamental importance in guaranteeing voting
rights. Such changes directly affect the ability of the individual to cast a ballot, and their effects are more easily observed than is the dilution of group
voting strength. 97 As the foregoing discussion has indicated, the Attorney
General's inquiry has been whether the submitted change in the individual
registration or voting process burdens minorities disproportionately. In practically all cases, the inquiry into disproportionate burden is consistent with the
retrogression test set forth in Beer, and consideration of vote dilution indicators from constitutional cases would not have changed the result. If the submitted change disproportionately burdens the minority, then it represents a
fortiori a "retrogression" from the status quo, because the burdens associated
with voting fell more equally on whites and minorities prior to the change.
Although constitutional "access" analysis and Beer's "retrogression" test
1978 & Aug. 11, 1978); Ft. Bend County, Tex. (May 2, 1977); Raymondville, Tex., Indep. School
Dist. (Mar. 25, 1977); Warren, Miss. (June 16, 1975); New Orleans, La. (July 17, 1973); St. Landry
Parish, La. (Dec. 6, 1972); Lafayette County, Miss. (July 16, 1971).
94. Objection letter to Pasquotank County, N.C. (Jan. 3, 1978) ("[l]n choosing the new location, the county deliberately by-passed other suitable locations, such as the St. James Church site
which would be more convenient to the black community in Elizabeth City."). See also the dis-

cussion of alternatives and invidious purpose in the redistricting context infra text accompanying
notes 298-312. See also Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 221-25 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
951 (1980). Cf. Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1178 (D.D.C.), qy'd, 439 U.S.
999 (1978) (rejection of alternatives to at-large elections suggests discriminatory purpose).
95. Objection letter to Apache County, Ariz., High School Dist. (Mar. 20, 1980).
96. Letter to Apache County, Ariz., High School Dist. (May 7, 1980) (withdrawing Mar. 20,
1980 objection).
97. This distinction appears frequently in constitutional voting rights cases. See Rogers v.
Lodge, 102 S.Ct. 3272,3282, (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,
83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring,) (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 58 (1964) (Harlan,

J., concurring)).
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are generally consistent in cases involving registration, polling places, and related changes, one recent case in these areas called upon the district court to
decide how much weight to give the retrogression test when the two approaches potentially reach different results. In Apache County High School
District v. United States98 the school district submitted a proposal containing
several changes affecting the Navajo minority in the district. The changes included a reduction in the number of polling places and a decision not to provide election information in oral Navajo. After the Attorney General
objected,9 9 the school district sought a declaratory judgment. The district
court first held that one of several submitted changes, a reduction in the
number of polling places, was clearly "retrogressive" under a simple analysis
similar to the Attorney General's treatment of polling place changes. 100 The
court then held that a second change, the failure to provide information in oral
Navajo, could not have been "retrogressive" within the meaning of Beer because the school board had not previously disseminated information in oral
0
Navajo.' '
If the retrogression test were a standard to be read broadly and applied
uniformly, the district court's analysis would have examined separately the
lack of oral Navajo information and the reduction in polling places. It then
would have found that failure to provide such information had no discriminatory "effect" under the retrogression test. Yet in Apache County, the district
court considered all of the submitted changes as a package and held that the
entire plan had a discriminatory effect even though one major element of the
plan could not have been "retrogressive."' 0 2 Since the two changes were not
severed, the retrogression test was not given uniform effect. A change that
should have passed the retrogression test because it was not retrogressive
prompted an objection solely because the Attorney General or the district
court happ6ned to consider it together with another, "retrogressive" change.
The result was avoidance of strict application of the retrogression test.
Apache County is unusual in that it is an "individual ballot" case that also
touches upon some of the difficulties with applying the Beer retrogression test.
The case is instructive, however, because it provides us with a glimpse of many
more difficult questions regarding the retrogression test. These questions will
become even more problematic in the analysis of the more complex changes
that are subject to section 5 preclearance. When the inquiry into discriminatory purpose or effect turns to questions of group voting strength, recognized
vote dilution indicators such as racially polarized voting, size of minority population, and past discrimination become more central to constitutional cases.
The role of the second, constitutionality prong of Beer has potential for
growth. At the same time, it becomes more difficult to apply the retrogression
98. No. 77-1518 (D.D.C. June 12, 1980).
99. Objection letter to Apache County, Ariz., High School Dist. (Oct. 4, 1976). See also
letters to Apache County, Ariz., High School Dist. (Dec. 23, 1976, May 3, 1977 & June 10, 1977).
100. No. 77-1518, slip op. at 13 (D.D.C. June 12, 1980).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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test because a status quo against which to compare the submitted change becomes increasingly difficult to ascertain.
IV.

AT-LARGE ELECTIONS AND ANTI-SINGLE-SHOT PROVISIONS

A minority population often has enough voting strength as a group to
elect one or more members of a city or county governing body in elections that
are conducted by single-member districts. If the election is at-large, however,
all seats are elected from throughout the jurisdiction, and in many cases white
10 3
majorities have maintained total or nearly total control.
Even in at-large elections, a minority-supported candidate may win election through "single-shot" or "bullet" voting if he or she has concentrated
support and white voters' support is dispersed among a larger number of white
candidates.t°4 Nevertheless, vote dilution in an at-large election system may
be exacerbated by various devices that inhibit single-shot voting. Five major
types of "anti-single-shot" or "anti-bullet-voting" devices prevent use of this
strategy by dividing a multi-seat election into several one-on-one contests,
each between one white candidate and one minority candidate.
One anti-single-shot device is a "majority vote requirement," which typically provides that a candidate can win only if he or she receives a majority of
the votes cast. If no candidate receives a majority, a runoff election is held.
Often, a candidate has enough concentrated minority support to be the top
vote-getter, but then loses in a runoff. Another anti-single-shot device is the
."full slate requirement," which compels each voter to vote for as many candidates as there are vacancies to be filled. Voters cannot vote only for candidates
of their choice, but rather must vote for some candidates whom they do not
support. If they do not cast the required number of votes, none of their votes
will be counted. Third, some jurisdictions divide contests into "numbered
posts." Each vacancy is filled separately, so that each candidate must choose
to run for a specific slot. A minority-supported candidate's chances are diminished because a white majority can control the election for each seat. Without
numbered posts, a candidate with concentrated minority support can win,
even if he or she receives fewer votes than some white candidates. Fourth, a
locality may use a "staggered terms" system under which only some seats are
filled at each election. Narrowing the field increases the ability of a white vot103. The Court in,41len held that § 5 covers changes from district to at-large elections. "The
right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on
casting a ballot." 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 555).
At-large elections and multimember districts were adopted for race-neutral reasons in many
instances. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 157 n.38, 158 n.39 (1971). Racial considerations, however, motivated adoption of multimember and at-large systems in many other areas,
even when black and other minority voter participation was low or even nonexistent at the time.
See S. REP. No. 417,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

Naws 203-04 (discussing the Bolden case on remand).
104. "Single-shot voting enables a minority group to win some at-large seats if it concentrates

its votes behind a limited number of candidates." UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT: TEN YEARS AFTER 207 (1975) [hereinafter cited as TEN YEARs AF-

TER], quoted with approvalin City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 184 n.19 (1980).
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ing majority to control each available seat. Finally, a "residency requirement"
can prevent single-shot voting. By requiring candidates to live in certain districts, the jurisdiction effectively can divide an at-large election into separate
contests. As with numbered posts and staggered terms, this division allows a
105
white voting majority to control each office to be filled.

A1.

Constitutional Standards

10 6
Vote dilution cases under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
have figured prominently in the treatment of at-large elections, multimember
districts, and anti-single-shot provisions under section 5 of the Voting Rights

Act.' 0 7 The seminal case employing constitutional "access" analysis was Whitcomb v. Chavis, a 1971 case, in which the United States Supreme Court held

that multimember districts in Marion County, Indiana did not per se violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

08

At the same

time, the Court also recognized that a multimember district could be unconstitutional under certain circumstances: "[multimember districts] may be subject
to challenge where the circumstances of a particular case may 'operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the
voting population.' "109

Constitutional cases also have considered anti-single-shot provisions in
conjunction with at-large or multimember schemes. White v. Regester, the

next key Supreme Court vote dilution case to follow Whitcomb, held that multimember districts with a majority vote requirement and numbered posts unconstitutionally diluted the voting strength of blacks and Mexican-Americans
105. See TEN YEARs AFTER, supra note 104, at 206-08. See also City of Lockhart v. United
States, No. 80-364, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. July 30, 1981),prob.juris noted, 102 S. Ct. 1609 (1982);
City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 184 n.19, 185 n.21.
106. According to Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Bolden, the fifteenth amendment applies only to practices that directly affect access to the ballot and does not apply to vote dilution
claims. 446 U.S. at 65. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Lodge Y. Buxton concluded
that a majority of the Bolden Court had not adopted the Stewart position. 639 F.2d at 1372. On
appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide this issue. Rogers v. Lodge,
102 S. Ct. at 3276 n.6. See also Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 205-06 (8th Cir.
1982); Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 919 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Uvalde Consol.
Indep. School Dist., 625 F.2d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1002 (1981). But see
McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1243 n.9 (5th Cir.), appealdisinissedsub nom. City
of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 453 U.S. 946 (1981).
107. Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Bolden cautioned that it may be "rash" to assume
that the standards governing at-large elections and multimember districts are the same. 446 U.S.
at 70. Justice Stewart himself, however, assumed that the same standards apply to both. Id.
Numerous courts and the Attorney General have agreed. See Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 878
(5th Cir. 1979); Corder v. Kirksey, 585 F.2d 708, 713 n.ll (5th Cir. 1978); Turner v. McKeithen,
490 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1973); objection letter to the State of South Carolina (Feb. 14, 1974).
108. 403 U.S. 124, 142 (1971). See supra text accompanying note 41 (discussing proportional
representation).
109. 403 U.S. at 143 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)). See also Rogers v.
Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3275-76; Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S.
73, 88 (1966); Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U.S. 269 (1966); Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965);
Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d at 1364; Nevett, 571 F.2d at 216; LeadershipRoundtable, 499 F. Supp.
at 581-84. See generally Bickerstaff, supra note 2, at 649-51; Note, Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember Districts: The ConstitutionalStandardAfter Washington v. Davis, 76 MICH. L. REV. 694,
695-98 (1978).
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in Dallas and Bexar Counties, Texas by limiting their opportunity to participate in the political process and elect legislators of their choice. 110 Plaintiffs
made their case by showing, first, that a history of official racial and ethnic
discrimination had affected the rights of minorities to register, vote, and participate in the political process. Second, the majority vote requirement in primary elections and the numbered posts contributed significantly to the
impermissible vote dilution."' Third, minorities were vastly underrepresented in elective positions and candidate slates. Fourth, restrictive voter
registration procedures had hindered minorities' efforts to register. Finally,
government officials had been unresponsive to the needs of the minorities in
12
these counties."

3
The next key vote dilution case was Zimmer v. McKeithen. '1
In Zimmer,
the Fifth Circuit held that multimember districts with anti-single-shot provisions unconstitutionally diluted the minority vote in East Carroll Parish, Louisiana. In so holding, the court listed several factors that could be used to
demonstrate unconstitutional vote dilution:
where a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of
slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference
for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past
discrimination in general precludes the effective participation in the
election system, a strong case is made. Such proof is enhanced by a
showing of the existence of large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and the lack of provision for
at-large candidiates running for particular geographical subdistricts.
The fact of dilution is established upon proof of the existence of an
aggregate of these factors. The Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in White v. Regester. . . demonstrates, however, that all these
factors need not be proved in order to obtain relief."i 4
During the years immediately following the Zimmer decision, courts in
voting rights and other constitutional cases have insisted on stronger showings
of discriminatory purpose before they will find that the fourteenth or fifteenth
amendment has been violated. In Washington v. Davis, 1 - an employment discrimination case, the Supreme Court held "that the invidious quality of a law
[neutral on its face] claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be

110. 412 U.S. at 763-65. The Court in White v. Regester did not question the general rule that
multimember districts and at-large elections are not per se unconstitutional. Id. at 765.
111. 412 U.S. at 766. Accord City ofRome, 446 U.S. at 184 n.20, aft'd, 472 F. Supp. at 244;
Nevett, 571 F.2d at 217 & n.10; Turner, 490 F.2d at 194; Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297,
1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), af'd on othergroundsper cinam sub nom. East Carroll Parish
School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206,211-12 (E.D.N.C.
1972).
112. 412 U.S. at 766-69.
113. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), afdon othergroundspercur/am sub nom. East
Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). See also Nevett, 571 F.2d at 217.
114. 485 F.2d at 1305 (footnote omitted). See also Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S.Ct. at 3277 n.8;
Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d at 920-22.
115. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."'

16

Numerous Fifth Circuit deci-

sions tried to reconcile the growing emphasis on "purpose" with the voting

rights principles declared in White, Whitcomb, and Zimmer. These Fifth Circuit cases generally held that the factors articulated in Zimmer were still the

key inquiry because they could be used to prove the
invidious purpose re17
quired under Washington v. Davis and its progeny.
In 1980, City of Mobile v. Bolden 118 threw the law into a state of confu-

sion. A plurality of the Supreme Court declared that the Zimmer factors,
taken alone, were "most assuredly insufficient to prove an unconstitutionally
discriminatory purpose in the present case."' "19 Thus, a constitutional vote dilution claim requires more than a mere showing that the discriminatory effect

was reasonably foreseeable. Instead, a plaintiff must show that "the decision
maker.

. .

selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part

'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."1

20

By requiring direct evidence of discriminatory purpose, Bolden represented a serious and arguably unrealistic obstacle to constitutional vote dilu-

tion litigation. More recently, however, in Rogers v. Lodge,' 2 1 a majority of
the Supreme Court affirmed a Fifth Circuit finding that the at-large election

system in Burke County, Georgia was unconstitutional, based on the evidentiary factors outlined in Zimmer. Justice White, writing for the majority,

stated that the district court had adequately "demonstrated its understanding
of the controlling standard," namely discriminatory intent.' 22 Moreover, the
district court clearly had been aware that its inquiry into invidious purpose
was not limited to the Zimmer factors. Under these circumstances, the majority was "not inclined to disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
116. Id. at 240. See also Personnel Adm. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Note, DiscriminatoryPurposeand
DiscriminatoryImpact: An Assessment Afier Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1376 (1979).
117. See Nevett, 571 F.2d at 228-29; City of Mobile v. Bolden, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978).
rev'd, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248
(5th Cir. 1978); Thomasville Branch of the NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.
1978).
118. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
119. Id. at 73. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently has analyzed the six separate
opinions in Bolden in the context of further fourteenth and fifteenth amendment challenges to atlarge and multimember district systems. See Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d at 1372-75. See also City
of West Helena, 675 F.2d at 204-05; Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d at 918-20; McMillan v.
Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1242-43 (5th Cir.), appealdismissed sub nom. City of Pensacola
v. Jenkins, 453 U.S. 946 (1981); Note, City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden: The Requirement of
DiscriminatoryIntent in Vote Dilution Claims, 32 BAYLOR L REV. 639 (1980); Comment, Ciy of
Mobile v. Bolden: 4 Setback in the Fight Against Discrimination,47 BROOKLYN L. REv. 169
(1980); Comment, The Standard ofProofin At-large Vote Dilution DiscriminationCasesAfier City
ofMobile v. Bolden, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 103 (1981); Note, The Supreme Cour, 1979 Term, 94
HARV. L. REV. 77, 144 (1980); Note, Voter Dilution and New Intent Requirements Under the Ffteenth and FourteenthAmendments, 18 Hous. L. REv. 611 (1981); Note, Voting Rights: Stuck
Inside ofMobile With the Voting BluesAgain: Vote Dilution Claims Confined, 10 STETSON L. REV.
363 (1981). 120. 446 U.S. at 72 n.17 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279).
121. 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
122. 102 S. Ct. at 3278.
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the District Court applied the proper legal standard."' 23
Thus, the Rogers v. Lodge majority held that the vote dilution factors
developed in While and Zimmer may be sufficient to establish a constitutional
violation in fourteenth and fifteenth amendment litigation when those factors
demonstrate discriminatory purpose.1 24 Even if these factors are constitutionally sufficient only in certain circumstances, Rogers v. Lodge confirms that
these factors remain highly relevant to constitutional analysis.' 25 Thus, they
remain highly relevant, under the second prong of Beer, to section 5 analysis,
even after the statutory shift in the burden of proof.126
B.

Objections to At-large Elections and Multimember Districts

Under the Attorney General's treatment of at-large elections under section 5, the two essential elements of an objection have been (1) racially or
123. Id.
124. Notwithstanding the combined effect of Rogers v. Lodge and City o/Mobile P. Bolden on
the constitutional basis for a vote dilution claim, future vote dilution litigation may be based
instead on § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982. Before these most recent amendments, § 2 of the Act tracked the language of the fifteenth amendment, and at least four justices of
the Supreme Court had expressed the view that § 2 and the fifteenth amendment were identical in
coverage and effect. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-61 (plurality opinion). The 1982 amendments, however, replaced prior § 2 with the following new language:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the.
State or political subdivision are not equally open to partcipation by members of a class
of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
considered: Pro ided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of
a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982). Both the language of new § 2 and its legislative
history make clear that in order to establish a violation, plaintiffs need not prove a discriminatory
purpose in the adoption or maintenance of the challenged system or practice. Instead, it is sufficient to show "that the challenged system or practice, in the context of all the circumstances in the
jurisdiction in question, results in minorities being denied equal access to the political process." S.
REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
177, 205. Fact patterns in which § 2 plaintiffs can make this showing with respect to "result" may
evolve as virtually indistinguishable from cases in which submitting jurisdictions have been unable to carry their § 5 burden to show lack of unconstitutional purpose.
125. See also Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 208 (8th Cir. 1982); Lodge v.
Buxton, 639 F.2d at 1373.
126. See, e.g., objection letter to Kosciusko, Miss. (Sept. 20, 1976). In that letter the Attorney
General explained an objection to at-large elections with numbered posts and a majority vote
requirement for city aldermanic elections in the following typical language:
In our analysis we have considered the factors enunciated in White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755 (1973), and the other cases to which it has given rise, including the history of
exclusion of minorities from the political process, the degree of responsiveness of the
elected representatives to the needs of the minority community, and the history of governmental discrimination in the area. See also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297
(5th Cir. 1973).
Id. See also objection letter to Edgefield County, S.C. (Feb. 8, 1979).
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ethnically polarized voting and (2) a minority population of sufficient size and
geographical concentration to elect at least one candidate of its choice in single-member district elections.1 27 The Attorney General has applied this test in
numerous instances to object to a change from single-member districts to atlarge elections in jurisdictions with a minority population percentage between
twenty-five percent and thirty-five percent.' 28 Other objections refer vaguely
to "significant" or "substantial" minority population without giving a percentage. 129 One important objection offers more specific guidance on how large
the minority population must be. Rockdale County, Georgia sought to abolish an appointed advisory board and at the same time to increase the number
of county commissioners from one to three. The commissioners would be
elected at-large to numbered posts for staggered four-year terms, with a majority vote requirement. The Attorney General objected because evidence
30
showed that the black population was between ten and seventeen percent.
Later information showed, however, that the black population was actually
less than ten percent. While reaffirming the basic rule that at-large elections
with anti-single-shot provisions are generally discriminatory when there is polarized voting and a significant minority, the Attorney General articulated a
significant limitation by observing, "[Tihe principle loses its vitality when the
minority proportion of the population decreases to a point where even alternative systems would not significantly enhance the opportunity of such a minor' 31
ity to elect a candidate of its choice."'
Under this reasoning, the number of seats on a governing body determines how much voting strength is needed to elect a candidate in a singlemember district and, in turn, whether a minority population is large enough to
conclude that at-large elections have a discriminatory effect. As a general rule,
this test is useful because there is usually an existing board with an established
number of seats. But where a new council is formed, as in Rockdale County,
the Attorney General's test concedes prdctically total discretion to the covered
jurisdiction to set the size of the governing body and thereby determine when
a minority population becomes "significant": "While it is obvious that the
larger the number of single-member districts the greater the chances of the
minority electing representation of its choice, suffice it to say that the Attorney
General has no authority under Section 5 to require the adoption of any par127. See objection letter to Charleston, S.C. (June 14, 1977) (citing White, Turner, Zimmer).
See also objection letters to Sumter County, S.C. (Dec. 3, 1976) ("black population. . . is relatively concentrated"); Sumter County, Ga. (July 13, 1973) ("significant concentrations of black
citizens"); Lowndes County, Miss., Bd. of Educ. (June 23, 1975) ("residential concentrations");
Calhoun County, S.C., School Dist. (Aug. 7, 1974) ("significant concentrations of black citizens").
128. See, e.g., objection letters to Henry County, Ga. (July 23, 1979) (31.9% black); Charleston
County, S.C. (June 14, 1977) (31% black); Horry County, S.C. (Nov. 12, 1976) (25% black); Pike
County, Ala. (Aug. 12, 1974) (34% black); Bibb County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. & Orphanage (Aug. 24,
1971) (34% black).
129. See, e.g., objection letters to Conecuh County, Ala. (Apr. 23, 1982); State of Mississippi
(July 8, 1977) ("cognizable racial minority"); Sumter County, S.C. (Dec. 3, 1976) ("substantial

proportion of the population").
130. Objection letter to Rockdale County, Ga. (July 1, 1977).
131. Letter to Rockdale County, Ga. (Sept. 9, 1977) (discussing July 1, 1977 objection).
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ticular form of government."' 132 A larger number of seats would reduce the
percentage of the vote needed to control one seat, and thus increase the likelihood that minorities could enjoy meaningful participation in the political process in a single-member district system. 133 Thus, had Rockdale County
decided to increase the number of commissioners from one to seven, for example, rather than to three, the Attorney General may have concluded that the
at-large election procedure had a discriminatory effect.
This analysis of at-large elections applies even when a minority group
constitutes a numerical majority, because a population majority still may be
unable to control at-large elections. A black numerical "majority" is still a
"minority" for section 5 purposes if black voter turnout is chronically low.134
One objection to at-large elections noted that "the fact that a minority racial or
ethnic group may constitute a majority of the population in a county does not
automatically remove the possibility of Fifteenth Amendment dilution
....
,"135 Under the same reasoning, at-large elections may also be objectionable on vote dilution grounds even if minority-supported candidates have had
some success.136 Further, if circumstances are such that purely at-large elections would prompt an objection, the Attorney General probably will object to
a hybrid plan that elects some council members by district and others atlarge. 137
Even when the number of seats on the governing body is fixed, it is not
always enough to look at polarized voting and the significance of the minority
population to determine how minority voters would fare in a single-member
district system. Here again, the retrogression test presents difficulty in some
132. Id.
133. See objection letter to Tyler, Tex. (Feb. 25, 1976) ("under the enlarged seven-member
council the representation which the affected minorities are given a realistic chance of electing is
reduced [from 20% with a five-member council] to 14%").
134. Hale County v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (D.D.C. 1980); objection letter to

Hale County, Ala. (Dec. 29, 1976). Accord Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 730-31 (W.D. Tex.
1972), ar'din relevantpartsub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768-70 (1973).
One objection concerned a change from at-large to single-member district elections where
Mexican-Americans constituted approximately 55% of the population. The city council in
Beeville, Texas had five members, elected at-large to staggered two-year terms. Candidates favored by Mexican-American voters frequently had been successful. In the context of racially
polarized voting, the Attorney General concluded that
the effect of the adoption of a single-member district plan may be to restrict the influence
of the Mexican American electorate in Beeville to districts one and two, although under
the prior at-large system or under alternative single-member district member plans Mexican Americans could potentially have greater influence.
Objection letter to Beeville, Tex. (Feb. 2, 1979). This language indicates that the objection probably was directed at the particular districting and not to single-member elections as such.
135. Objection letter to Calhoun County, S.C., School Dist. (Aug. 7, 1974). See also Moore v.
Leflore County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 502 F.2d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1974); objection letters to
Edgefield County, S.C. (Feb. 8, 1979); State of Mississippi (July 8; 1977).
136. See objection letter to Charleston County, S.C. (June 14, 1977). See also United States v.
Board of Supervisors, 571 F.2d 951, 956 (5th Cir. 1978); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d
139, 149 & n.21 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
137. See, e.g., objection letters to Corpus Christi, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 3, 1980);
Nacogdoches, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 3, 1980); Allendale County, S.C. (Nov. 25, 1977).
But see objection letter to Houston, Tex. (June 11, 1979).
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cases. On the one hand, the presence of these two essential elements may
show that at-large elections in the abstract are retrogressive as compared with

minority votingpotentialin single-member districts. On the other hand, strict
application of the retrogression test suggests that this sort of abstract analysis

must give way to an inquiry focusing on the existing single-member districts
that constitute the status quo in the covered jurisdiction.

The district court decision in Wilkes County v. United States 38 illustrates
this dilemma. Wilkes County, Georgia had sought preclearance for a change

from single-member districts to at-large elections. The district court held that
the change would have a discriminatory purpose or effect. The retrogression

test could have required the court to use the existing single-member districts as
a benchmark to determine whether blacks in Wilkes County would be better

or worse off after the proposed change. But because the existing single-member districts were "severely malapportioned," the district court decided not to
use them as the status quo for purposes of the retrogression test. 139 Instead,
the court compared the submitted at-large scheme with hypothetical fairly

drawn single-member districts and found discriminatory effect.' 4 0 In so doing, the district court, as a concession to the difficulty of defining the status
quo, avoided strict application of the retrogression test and employed a test
similiar to the general standards of access to the political process used in con-

stitutional cases.'1 t Thus, under Wilkes County, a submitting jurisdiction in
which the two essential elements are present may fail to prove constitutionality
even if there is no retrogression.
Nevertheless, the tendency to restrict the retrogression test in the at-large
election context has not been uniform. In Charlton County Board ofEducation

v. United States,142 the district court refused to abandon inquiry into retrogression. In that case, the court considered a change from an appointed to an
elected board of education, for which the new elections would be at-large with
staggered terms and numbered posts. The Attorney General objected, 143 but
138. 450 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C.), af'd, 439 U.S. 999 (1978).
139. 450 F. Supp. at 1178. The court observed that the proposal would diminish black voting
power even as compared with the "severely malapportioned" districts. Id at 1176. Nevertheless,
the court's opinion leaves little doubt that it would have used the same analysis even if at-large
elections would actually enhance black voting strength over the existing single-member districts.
140. The district court stated, "Since the existing election districts are severely malapportioned, it is appropriate, in measuring the effect of the voting changes, to compare the voting
changes with options for properly apportioned single-member district plans." Id at 1178.
141. In evaluating the probable outcome under hypothetical single-member district elections,
the Attorney General generally has assumed that district lines will be "fairly drawn." The objection to at-large elections in Terrell County, Georgia contains typical language: "Residential patterns in the county are such that the creation of seven fairly-drawn single-member districts
satisfying applicable legal requirements could be expected to result in some districts having a
black majority in population." Objection letter to Terrell County, Ga. (Dec. 16, 1977) (emphasis
added).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals employed a similar analysis in Moore, a constitutional
vote dilution case, ordering simultaneous abandonment of at-large elections and a redistricting
scheme to correct prior malapportionment. 502 F.2d at 625-27. See also objection letters to Butler
County, Ala. (July 19, 1982); Henry County, Ga. (May 27, 1980 & July 23, 1979).
142. No. 78-0564 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 1978).
143 Objection letter to Charlton County, Ga. (June 21, 1977).
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the district court held that the change was ameliorative under the retrogression
test. 44 The court pointed out that blacks had never been appointed under the
old system but had enjoyed success in recent elections.' 45 The court also
found "no substantial evidentiary basis from which racial bloc voting can be
inferred."' 46 The Attorney General argued in support of his objection that the
retrogression test is meaningless if applied to an entirely new system. Invoking general principles of vote dilution, he argued that "the only comparison
that can be made is to compare the value of the vote granted to white residents
with the value of the vote granted to black residents."' 47 The district court

expressly rejected this interpretation of the retrogression test, reasoning that
elections "clearly enhanced the ability of minorities to participate in the political process" as compared with an appointive method that had totally ex48
cluded them.1
Although Charlton County at first glance appears to treat the retrogression
test as decisive in spite of a different result dictated by constitutional vote dilution standards, the case may not be of great general significance. In Charlton
County blacks had fared very poorly under the existing appointive system.
The key fact was the apparent extent of black political successes in elections,
49
even those conducted at-large with staggered terms and numbered posts.'

When the circumstances indicate vote dilution, however, an objection will still
be interposed. In several instances both before and after Charlton County, the
Attorney General objected to similiar appointive-to-elective changes when the
new elections would be conducted at-large with anti-single-shot provisions.
For example, the Attorney General found that blacks in Horry County, South
Carolina, had done poorly in county elections, that there was a pattern of racial bloc voting, and that the majority vote requirement "emerge[d] as a very
significant factor in.

.

. Horry County."' 50

144. No. 78-0564, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 1978).
145. Id. at 3, 6.
146. Id at 6.
147. Id at 8.
148. Id at 9.
149. This fact may explain the objection letter to Long County, Georgia (July 16, 1976), in
which the Attorney General indicated that a change from an appointive to an at-large elective
board of education would be precleared as long as there were no anti-single-shot provisions.
150. Objection letter to Horry County, S.C. (Nov. 12, 1978). See also objection letters to Harris County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. (Aug. 18, 1975); Bibb County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. & Orphanage (Aug.
24, 1971). In one case, however, the Attorney General offered to preclear the creation of a new atlarge judgeship if anti-single-shot provisions were eliminated. See objection letter to Baton
Rouge, Louisiana (Feb. 7, 1980) (withdrawn Oct. 10, 1980).
The Rockdale County case is another instance of an objection to a method of election, even
though under the prior system there had been only one county commissioner. The Attorney General's objection may also have relied on the recent appointment of a black to the county advisory
board, which the new county commission would replace. Objection letter to Rockdale County,
Ga. (July 1, 1977).
Several objections have concerned shifts from elective to appointive offices and reductions in
the frequency of elections. In these situations, the Attorney General has asked whether the change
was proposed in a context of increasing minority influence in elections. For example, the Attorney
General objected to abolishing the elective office of Superintendent of Education in Clarendon
County, South Carolina, because black candidates would run if elections were continued. Objection letter to Clarendon County, S.C. (Nov. 13, 1973). In Tunica County, Mississippi, the Attor-
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Objections to Anti-Single-Shot Provisions

The close relationship that has developed in constitutional cases between
at-large elections' 5 ' and anti-single-shot provisions has continued in the Attorney General's objections under section 5. In accord with White v. fRegester,

an objection to at-large elections is more likely when there are also anti-singleshot provisions, because these provisions52will "tend further to highlight the

dilutive effect of the at-large proposal."'

Not surprisingly, then, the analysis of anti-single-shot provisions under

section 5 has resembled the approach to at-large elections.'

53

Racially po-

larized voting and a substantial minority population have been the two key
ney General objected to changing the office of Superintendent of Education from elective to
appointive because the change "was adopted at a time when blacks had just begun to regain the
franchise in Mississippi." Objection letter to Tunica County, Miss., Bd. of Educ. (Jan. 24, 1977).
Similarly, the Attorney General objected when the State of Alabama proposed to appoint rather
than elect certain judges. Blacks had won election to that office in the past, and evidence indicated
a significant risk that making the office appointive would reduce opportunities for black political
participation. Objection letter to the State of Ala. (Dec. 20, 1972). The Attorney General also
objected to a proposal to change the office of City Clerk in Shaw, Mississippi from an elective to
an appointed position. Objection letter to Shaw, Miss. (Nov. 21, 1973). See also objection letters
to Sumter County, S.C. (Oct. 1, 1976); State of South Carolina (Sept. 8, 1975).
Efforts to postpone elections have prompted similiar objections. The Attorney General objected when Hollandale, Mississippi, indefinitely postponed an election for city clerk because
"members of the black community in Hollandale were interested in supporting a candidate or
candidates for the clerk's post this year." Objection letter to Hollandale, Miss. (July 9, 1973). In
the Waller, Texas, Consolidated School District, the Attorney General objected to moving an
election to a date in August, when 3000 faculty and students at a predominantly black university
in the district would be away on vacation. Objection letter to Waller, Tex., Consol. School Dist.
(Mar. 10, 1978).
See objection letters to Chester County, S.C. (Sept. 26, 1979); Fort Worth, Tex., Indep.
School Dist. (Jan. 16, 1978); Sumter County, S.C. (Oct. 1, 1976); East Dublin, Ga. (June 19, 1974).
See also objection letter to Statesboro, Ga. (Feb. 2, 1981). But see letter to Statesboro, Ga. (May
13, 1981) (withdrawing objection).
151. Just as the principles governing at-large elections and multimember districts are substantially identical, the analysis of anti-single-shot provisions is practically the same whether they are
implemented in at-large elections or in multimember districts. See objection letters to Orleans
Parish, La. (Aug. 15, 1975) (numbered posts and majority vote requirement in multimember districts); Sumter County, Ala., Democratic Executive Comm. (Oct. 29, 1974) (full slate requirement
in multimember districts); Evangeline Parish, La., School Bd. & Police Jury (June 25 & July 26,
1974) (numbered posts, majority vote requirement, full slate requirement, and staggered terms in
multimember districts).
152. Objection letter to Chambers County, Ala., Bd. of Educ. (Mar. 10, 1976). See also objection letters to Chester County, S.C. (Oct. 28, 1977); Long County, Ga. (July 16, 1976).
153. Substantially the same analysis applies to each of the standard anti-single-shot provisions. At least two jurisdictions simply resubmitted changes after substituting one anti-single-shot
device for another device to which the Attorney General already had objected. In both cases, the
Attorney General objected again, noting that the substitution made no difference. See objection
letters to Thomasville, Ga. (Aug. 27, 1973 & Aug. 24, 1972) ("there is little difference between the
racial effect of at-large voting with majority and residency requirements and at-large voting with
majority and numbered posts requirements"); Newnan, Ga. (June 10, 1975 & Oct. 13, 1971) (staggered terms and numbered posts have "same effect on potential voting strength of racial minorities").
In one case, however, the Attorney General objected to a change from residency districts to
numbered posts because the residency districts had "provided the black community. . . with the
potential to influence the selection of candidates likely to be responsive to their interests." Objection letter to Griffin-Spaulding County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. (July 6, 1981). See also letter to GriffinSpaulding County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. (Sept. 28, 1981) (declining to withdraw the objection). But
see objection letter to Guilford County, N.C. (Mar. 1, 1982) ("The proposed residency districts
would operate essentially as numbered posts").
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elements giving rise to an objection. Numerous objections to anti-single-shot
provisions have relied on these two elements without further analysis. For
example, an objection to a majority vote requirement in Mullins, South Carolina simply stated:
Our analysis reveals that blacks constitute a substantial proportion of
the population of the City of Mullins, that the city council is elected
at large, and that racial bloc voting may exist. Under these circumstances, recent court decisions, to which we feel obligated to give
great weight, indicate that a majority vote requirement could have
the potential for abridging minority voting rights.154
As with at-large elections, an objection to an anti-single-shot provision
requires racially or ethnically polarized voting. The Attorney General withdrew earlier objections to numbered posts in Monahans, Texas and to a majority vote requirement and numbered posts in the Midland, Texas,
Independent School District for lack of racially polarized voting.' 55 As to
Midland, the Attorney General stated, "we do not conclude that racial bloc
voting exists in the Midland ISD elections to such an extent as to provide the
implementation of the majornecessary basis for a continued objection to the
56
ity vote and numbered posts requirements.'
The definition of "substantial" minority population should be the same
for both at-large elections and anti-single-shot provisions because the core interest, election to one seat on a multimember governing body, is the same.
Indeed, the Rockdale County objection t57 itself arose in the context of both atlarge elections and several anti-single-shot provisions.' 5 8 Consistent with that
analysis, the Attorney General objected to numbered posts in the Comal,
Texas, Independent School District, which had a Mexican-American population of approximately seventeen percent.' 59 As a general rule, a minority popto twenty-five percent is a "substantial minority
ulation of twenty
60
population."'1
At least two objections have been based on the combined population of
two distinct minority groups. 16 At the other extreme, anti-single-shot provi154. Objection letter to Mullins, S.C. (June 30, 1978) (citing White, Zimmer, Nevelt). Many
other objections articulate this standard in substantially identical language. See, e.g., objection

letters to Angleton, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Mar. 15, 1982) (majority vote requirement and
numbered posts); Ector County, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Mar. 15, 1982 & July 7, 1978) (same);
Marion, S.C. (July 5, 1978) (majority vote requirement); Seneca, S.C. (Sept. 13, 1976) (same);
Lockney, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Mar. 30, 1976) (majority vote requirement and numbered
posts); East Dublin, Ga. (Mar. 4, 1974) (numbered posts and staggered terms).
155. Letters to Midland, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Nov. 13, 1978) (withdrawing Aug. 6, 1976
objection); Monahans, Tex. (June 1, 1976) (withdrawing Mar. i1, 1976 objection).
156. Letter to Midland, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Nov. 13, 1978) (withdrawing objection).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
158. See objection letter to Rockdale County, Ga. (July 1, 1977); letter to Rockdale County,
Ga. (Sept. 9, 1977).
159. Objection letter to Comal, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 4, 1977).
160. See, e.g., objection letters to Corsicana, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 28, 1978) (majority vote requirement and numbered posts; 23% black population); Pageland, S.C. (Mar. 22, 1977)
(majority vote requirement; 23% black population).
161. Objection letters to Prairie Lea, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 11, 1977) (majority vote
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sions have prompted objections even where the minority group constituted a
numerical majority.' 62 As with at-large elections, the election of some minor-

that anti-single-shot provisions have
ity candidates has not precluded a finding
163
a discriminatory, vote-dilutive effect.

The analyses of at-large elections and anti-single-shot provisions differ
from each other in several respects.'

64

First, an objection to anti-single-shot

provisions should not-require that a minority population be geographically
insular. Effective single-shot voting does not presuppose that a minority is
concentrated in a particular district. Second, several objections have suggested

that government interests may justify anti-single-shot provisions in certain circumstances. For example, an objection to a majority vote requirement in
Hollywood, South Carolina stated:

Because of the potential for diluting black voting strength inherent in
the use of a majority vote requirement in Hollywood and because the
town has advancedno compelling reasonfor its use, we are unable to
requirement and numbered posts, 20% Mexican-American and 10% black); Luling, Tex. (Mar. 29,
1976) (numbered posts; 25% Mexican-American and 16% black).
162. E.g., objection letters to Madison, Ga. (July 29, 1975) (majority vote requirement and
numbered posts); Wadley, Ga. (Oct. 30, 1974) (same); Calhoun County, S.C., School Dist. (Aug. 7,
1974) (at-large elections and staggered terms). The analogous rule for at-large elections is discussed supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
163. See Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 149 n.21; Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir.
1973) (en bane), aff'd on other groundsper curiam sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); objection letter to Charleston County, S.C. (June 14, 1977). Similar principles for at-large elections are discussed supra at text accompanying note 136.
164. These observations apply to the vast majority of cases that involve the five classic antisingle-shot provisions discussed supra text accompanying notes 104-05. In addition, several
unique situations involving changes closely related to anti-single-shot provisions deserve mention.
Several objections have blocked discriminatory changes in the candidate nomination process
of political parties. In 1979, for example, the State of Mississippi passed an "open primary" law.
Act of Mar. 30, 1979, ch. 452, 1979 Miss. Laws 834. Previously, political parties had nominated
candidates through a primary election, after which party nominees and independents ran in the
general election. Under the proposed system, all opposed candidates, regardless of party affiliation, would run in a "preferential" election. If no candidate received a majority, the two candidates receiving the most votes for each office in the preferential election would then run in a
general election. Id, §§ 1-6, at 834-35. The Attorney General objected, first, because the proposal
would effectively introduce a majority vote requirement, and second, because it would limit the
political influence exercised by blacks through the Democratic Party. His objection noted, "The
information provided in your submission and an analysis of recent elections show the important
role that blacks have acquired in the Democratic Party in Mississippi. The elimination of the
present system of partisan primaries and party nominations will eliminate this political advantage
that blacks have obtained." Objection letter to the State of Mississippi (June 11, 1979). See also
objection letters to the State of Mississippi (Aug. 23, 1976 & June 4, 1975).
A similar situation arose in Texas in 1973. Legislation required any political party that received between 2% and 20% of the vote to nominate its candidates by convention rather than by
primary election. Act of June 15, 1973, ch. 542, § 6, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1404, 1409 (codified at
TEX. REv.CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 13.45 (Vernon Supp. 1982)). The change would have severely
disadvantaged any affected political party, because the state reimbursed political parties for primary elections but not for conventions. It was well-known that the proposal would affect only one
party, La Raza Unida, and thus "significantly limit the opportunity for Mexican-Americans to
nominate, on an equal basis with others, a candidate of their choice." Objection letter to the State
of Texas (Jan. 26, 1976). The Attorney General ruled that the proffered justification, "lessening of
the burdens and expense of state-financed primary elections," did not justify the discriminatory
effect. Id.
See also objection letters to the State of Alabama (July 19, 1982, Jan. 16, 1976 & Aug. 1,
1969).
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conclude that the burden of proof has been sustained and that the

imposition of the majority requirement, in the context of an at-large
election system, will not
have a racially discriminatory effect in the
65

Town of Hollywood.

This suggestion that other government interests may justify the change is absent from objections to at-large elections. Nevertheless, a strict standard applies whenever a locality seeks to justify an anti-single-shot provision. For
example, when the Comal, Texas, Independent School District stated that "the
change to running by place was done to simplify the ballot and to avoid confusion on the part of the voters,"'166 the Attorney General responded, "it has not
been demonstrated why such a problem could not be eliminated through edu-

167
cation efforts and clear instructions on the ballot."
The third and most important difference. between the treatment of antisingle-shot provisions and at-large elections is that objection letters in the former instance sometimes discuss whether single-shot voting would be an effective political strategy for minorities in the local political situation. Several
objections have taken the following approach: "where there is increasing participation in the political process by the black community as in Darlington, a
majority [vote] and residency requirement have the practical effect of eliminat-

ing the potential for minority voters to elect candidates of their choice through
68
the use of single-shot voting."'

In concluding that single-shot voting would be an effective minority strategy, some objections have merely pointed out that adoption of anti-single-shot
provisions was a local reaction to the election of minority-supported candidates through single-shot voting. For example, Williamston, North Carolina
proposed staggered terms soon after the first black had been elected to the

board of commissioners. 169 In other instances objections have observed that
165. Objection letter to Hollywood, S.C. (June 3, 1977) (emphasis added). Other objections
contain substantially similiar language. See, e.g., objection letters to West Orange-Cove, Tex.,
Consol. Indep. School Dist. (Feb. 9, 1981) (majority vote requirement and numbered posts); Alto,
Tex., Indep. School Dist. (May 1I,1979) (same); Lancaster, S.C. (Sept. 19, 1978) (majority vote
requirement); Marion, S.C. (July 5, 1978) (same); Neches, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 7, 1978)
(majority vote requirement and numbered posts); Prairie Lea, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 11,
1977) (same).
166. Objection letter to Comal, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 4, 1977) (quoting letter from
Comal Indep. School Dist. to Attorney Gen. (Jan. 31, 1977)).
167. Id. Similarly, the Attorney General has stated that a county's goal of guaranteeing
county-wide representation could be achieved through single-member districts rather than
through the residency districts that the county proposed. Objection letter to Guilford County,
N.C. (Mar. 1, 1982). See also objection letters to Fort Valley, Ga. (May 13, 1974) (majority vote
requirement and numbered posts); East Dublin, Ga. (Mar. 4, 1974) (numbered posts and staggered terms).
168. Objection letter to Darlington, S.C. (Aug. 17, 1973) (majority vote and residency requirements). For virtually identical language, see objection letters to Tomson, Ga. (Sept. 3, 1974) (majority vote requirement, numbered posts, and staggered terms); Perry, Ga. (Aug. 14, 1973)
(majority vote requirement). See also objection letter to Rock Hill, S.C. (Dec. 12, 1978) (majority
vote requirement).
169. Objection letter to Williamston, N.C. (Feb. 4, 1977). The objection did not, however, cite
specific evidence of discriminatory purpose. See also objection letters to Alapaha, Ga. (Mar. 24,
1980) (majority vote requirement and numbered posts); Laurinburg, N.C. (Dec. 12, 1978) (majority vote requirement and staggered terms); Sumter County, S.C. (Oct. 1, 1976) (residency require-
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although few minority candidates had won election in the past, the candidates
single-shot voting in light of recent increases in minorcould now benefit from
70
ity political activity.'
More detailed objections have examined election results to determine the
actual or potential effectiveness of single-shot voting. For example, in Colleton County, South Carolina, the Attorney General found that "had a majority vote been required for election to the board of education in 1972 the black
candidate would not have been elected."' 7 ' Staggered terms for the Gretna,
Virginia town council prompted an objection under similiar reasoning. The
Attorney General observed, "Since 1971, eight black candidates have run for
city office. None have placed higher than fifth, a position insufficient to
72
achieve election under the plurality system, were staggered terms in effect."'
In Reidsville, North Carolina "all three of the black persons who were elected
successively to the council over the last eleven years initially obtained incumbency by placing fifth, a position that would not have resulted in their election
under the proposed change.'' 73 And in Greenville, North Carolina, "since
1965 only one black candidate has achieved election, and then only by placing
sixth when he was first elected with a plurality of the vote."174
Minority defeats in runoff elections also have provided strong evidence
that single-shot voting would be viable and therefore that anti-single-shot provisions have a discriminatory effect. The district court took this approach in
City ofRome v. United States, pointing out that the most recent serious black
candidate "would have been elected under the pre-1966 plurality-win system,
but was defeated by the white candidate in the runoff election under the majority vote regime."' 175 In Jonesboro, Georgia the only black town council
member originally had won election with a plurality. An objection was issued
when he was later defeated after the town adopted a majority vote requirement and numbered posts provision.' 76 In Chester County, South Carolina,
at-large elections with residency and majority vote requirements prompted an
objection because recent black candidates would have won with a plurality but
had lost to white candidates in runoffs. 177 Similiarly, in the June 1976 Demoment); Cuthbert, Ga. (Apr. 9, 1973) (numbered posts); Hogansville, Ga. (Aug. 2, 1972) (majority
vote requirement and numbered posts).
170. See, e.g., objection letters to Woodville, Tex. (Nov. 12, 1976) (numbered posts); Hereford,
Tex., Indep. School Dist. (May 24, 1976) (majority vote requirement and numbered posts).
171. Objection letter-to Colleton County, S.C. (Feb. 6, 1978) (staggered terms).

172. Objection letter to Gretna, Va. (Sept. 27, 1979).
173. Objection letter to Reidsville, N.C. (Aug. 3, 1979) (staggered terms).
174. Objection letter to Greenville, N.C. (Apr. 7, 1980) (majority vote requirement). See also
objection letters to Griffin-Spaulding, Ga., Bd. of Educ. (July 6, 1981) (numbered posts);
Laurinburg, N.C. (Dec. 12, 1978) (majority vote requirement); Clute, Tex. (June 17, 1977) (same);
Cameron, S.C. (Nov. 15, 1976) (same); Athens, Ga. (Oct. 23, 1975) (same); Jonesboro, Ga. (Feb. 4,
1972) (majority vote requirement and numbered posts).
175. 472 F. Supp. 221, 244 (D.D.C. 1979), aft'd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). In his earlier objection
letter, the Attorney General had pointed out that "a black candidate for school board received the
highest vote among 4 candidates in the primary but lost to a white opponent in the run-off."
Objection letter to Rome, Ga. (Oct. 20, 1975).
176. Objection letter to Jonesboro, Ga. (Feb. 4, 1972).
177. Objection letter to Chester County, S.C. (Oct. 28, 1977).
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cratic primary in Horry County, South Carolina, "one black candidate was
among the eight persons receiving the greatest number of votes and would
'78
have been one of that party's nominees but for the majority requirement."'
The extent of some objection letters' inquiry into past election results and
thus into the viability of single-shot voting under particular local conditions
once again raises fundamental questions about the retrogression test. On the
one hand, the particularized inquiry into election results in Colleton County
(South Carolina), Gretna (Virginia) and similiar cases suggests that the Attorney General would preclear an anti-single-shot provision if the submitting jurisdiction can show that single-shot voting has not been a viable minority
election strategy. Indeed, this is the approach that the retrogression test would
seem to require; if single-shot voting cannot be effective, then anti-single-shot
provisions cannot be retrogressive even if they are vote-dilutive under the
analysis in constitutional voting rights cases.
On the other hand, one recent district court case, City of Lockhart v.
UnitedStates,179 suggests that an analysis of potential retrogression under the
specific local circumstances is not an essential element of an objection. Thus,
once again the district court significantly limited the retrogression test in
favor of Beer's second prong inviting consideration of constitutional indices of
vote dilution. The case arose when Lockhart, Texas sought preclearance for a
five-member city commission, to be elected at-large with numbered posts and
staggered terms. The existing commission consisted of three members elected
at-large to numbered posts. The Attorney General objected,' 80 and the city
then filed a declaratory judgment action in the district court.
The district court first observed that the prior use of numbered posts by a
general-law city such as Lockhart was contrary to Texas law.' 8 ' The court
concluded that it would treat the prior numbered-post provision "as if it never
had existed" for the purpose of determining whether the submitted change
represented a "retrogression" within the meaning of Beer.'8 2 Thus, in a manner reminiscent of Wilkes County,'8 3 the court defined the status quo as a
three-member commission elected at-large but without numbered posts or any
other anti-single-shot device.
Having defined the status quo in a manner that rendered the retrogression
test analytically insignificant by guaranteeing a finding of retrogression, the
district court then set forth an alternative holding that casts serious doubt on
whether an analysis of retrogression under specific local circumstances can
ever save an anti-single-shot provision. Because the commission would be enlarged at the same time that the anti-single-shot provisions would be adopted,
the proposed change would not have restricted the existing possibilities for
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Objection letter to Horry County, S.C. (Nov. 12, 1976).
No. 80-364 (D.D.C. July 30, 1981),prob.juris noted, 102 S. Ct. 1609 (1982).
Objection letter to Lockhart, Tex. (Sept. 14, 1979).
City ofLockhart, slip op. at 2-3, 8-9.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
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single-shot voting.' 8 4 Nevertheless, the majority of the three-judge panel re-

fused to preclear the anti-single-shot provisions, even "assuming the validity
of the original two numbered-post provisions."

85

The majority observed that

single-shot voting would be a viable minority strategy within races for each
numbered post,' 8 6 but that "the provision for an additional two numbered

posts in conjunction with the provision for staggered terms has a synergistic
discriminatory effect."' 8 7 These points, however, were probably irrelevant to
the retrogression inquiry, because there would have been no additional elections at all without the change and resulting increase in the number of commission seats. 18 8

City of Lockhart comes very close to holding that implementing a device
with a discriminatory track record and significant potential for unconstitutional vote dilution under the local circumstances is objectionable per se, even
if other, simultaneous changes keep the change from being retrogressive in

that particular setting. Indeed, the key sentence in the City of Lockhart opinion is simply: "Both the Congress and the Supreme Court have established
that the imposition of numbered posts and staggered terms have a discriminatory impact on minority voting rights."' 8 9
V.

ANNEXATIONS AND CONSOLIDATIONS

An annexation or consolidation' 9" may be discriminatory if it decreases a
locality's minority population percentage.' 9' Nevertheless, the courts and the
Attorney General have recognized that section 5 was not meant to lock juris92
Accordingly, an annexadictions permanently in their existing boundaries.'
either of two showings.
make
tion generally will be approved if the locality can
184. See CitQy ofLockhart, slip op. at 12-16 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 10. The original commission consisted of a mayor and two commissioners, while
the proposed five-member city commission was to include a mayor and four commissioners.
186. Id. at 5.
187. Id. at 10.
188. Id. at 12-16 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting). Cf. objection letter to Rockdale County, Ga.
(July 1, 1977), discussed supra text accompanying notes 130-32 & 150.
189. Id. at 11.
190. The same rules apply to both annexations and consolidations. See City of Port Arthur v.
United States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 1010 (D.D.C. 1981), prob.jurs.noted, 102 S. Ct. 1272 (1982);
objection letters to Port Arthur, Tex. (Mar. 24, 1978 & Mar. 5, 1980); Victoria, Tex., Indep. School
Dist. (Apr. 2, 1976). For convenience, this article refers to both types of boundary expansion as
"annexations."
191. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388-90. See also City ofRome, 446 U.S. at 187;
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1975). The recognition that boundary
adjustments have significant discriminatory potential stems from Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960). Section 5 covers boundary enlargements to the extent that they aflect the conduct of
elections. An objection prevents elections in the annexed territory but does not affect the validity
of the annexation itself. See City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 n.2
(D.D.C. 1972) (per curiam), af'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
Annexations under § 5 are given general treatment in Note, JudicialReview ofMunicipalAnnexations Under Section 5 ofthe Voting Rights Act, 12 URB. L. ANN. 311 (1976); Note, Securing a
ValidAnnexation in Virginia" State and FederalRequirements, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 557 (1976).
192. City ofRichmond, 422 U.S. at 368-69 (citing Perkins, 400 U.S. at 388-89); City ofPort
Arthur, 517 F. Supp. at 1011; City oRome, 472 F. Supp. at 245; City ofPetersburg,354 F. Supp. at
1030.
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First, it can show that the annexation will not reduce appreciably the minority
population percentage. Alternatively, it can show that the expanded city's minority population, even if smaller in percentage, still will enjoy representation
that is193"reasonably commensurate with its voting strength in the expanded
City."' The condition that is imposed most often to achieve this result is the
94
single-member district election.'
A4.

DemographicEffect

The Attorney General's analysis of annexations and consolidations generally has started with demographic information on the new territory. The annexation will be precleared if it does not reduce the minority population
percentage in the jurisdiction. 95 If an annexation reduces the minority population percentage, however, the Attorney General has often objected even
when the reduction is very small. For example, the Attorney General objected
to a reduction of the black population share by 0.9 percent in Statesboro,
Georgia, 196 and to a reduction by 1.0 percent in Monroe, Georgia.' 97 The
Attorney General also objected to an annexation in Houston, Texas that reduced the black population from 26.0 percent to 24.8 percent and the Mexican-American population from 14.0 percent to 13.5 percent.' 9 8 In other cases,
193. ciy ofRome, 472 F. Supp. at 246. Accord United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
160 (1977). See objection letters to Indianola, Miss. (June 1, 1981); Mendenhall, Miss. (Jan. 12,

1981); New Bern, N.C. (Sept. 29, 1980) (withdrawn Oct. 5, 1981); letter to Greenville, N.C. (Apr.
7, 1980). See also letter to Lake Providence, La. (May 21, 1982) (withdrawing objection of Dec. 1,
1972). Cf. objection letter to Houston, Tex. (June 11, 1979).
194. See City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378; City ofPetersburg,354 F. Supp. at 1031. See also
infra text accompanying notes 241-45.
195. See, e.g., letter to College Park, Ga. (May 22, 1978) (withdrawing objection of Dec. 9,
1977).
The Attorney General usually has evaluated any anticipated development in the annexed
areas. For example, one objection noted, "houses are under construction at this time on part of
the land,. . . these houses are in a fairly expensive price range, and ...the area is located next to
a white residential area in the city." Objection letter to Alabaster, Ala. (Dec. 27, 1977). Similar
scrutiny of planned development prompted another recent objection:
Your submission also indicates that the owner of the land desires to build multi-family
apartment buildings on the land and intends to seek financial assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Section 8 Program. If the HUD
grant is obtained, a substantial number of black persons may reside in the new residential units. If the owner does not pursue his plan or if the grant is not obtained, the
submission indicates that virtually all of the persons who will reside in the new residential units will be white.
Objection letter to Statesboro, Ga. (Aug. 15, 1980). The Attorney General concluded that "the
City has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the development will, in fact, be completed as planned." Id.
Numerous similar objections have examined anticipated population changes. Eg., objection
letters to Mendenhall, Miss. (Jan. 12, 1981); Pleasant Grove, Ala. (Feb. 1, 1980); Statesboro, Ga.
(Dec. 10, 1979); Fairfield, Ala. (Apr. 16, 1975). In several objections, however, the Attorney General failed to examine the anticipated use of uninhabited land without explaining why. E.g., objection letters to Rocky Mount, N.C. (Dec. 9, 1977); San Antonio, Tex. (Apr. 2, 1976), Shreveport,
La. (Mar. 31, 1976); Bessemer, Ala. (Sept. 12, 1975); letter to Rome, Ga. (Oct. 20, 1975).
196. Objection letter to Statesboro, Ga. (Dec. 10, 1979).
197. Objection letter to Monroe, Ga. (Oct. 13, 1976).
198. Objection letter to Houston, Tex. (June 11, 1979) (withdrawn Sept. 21, 1979).
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however, the Attorney General has regarded decreases as de minimis. 199
The characterization of an annexation as either "minute but significant"
or "de minimis" should not depend merely on the size of the decrease in minority population percentage. The demographic information should be considered, as it has been in several submissions, in light of two factors: (1) the
sensitivity of the majority-minority balance as evidenced in recent elections;
and (2) the cumulative effect of a series of annexations.
Where the minority group and the white population are approximately
equal in size, a minute shift in racial or ethnic balance should prompt an objection more readily. 20 0 In Newellton, Louisiana, an objection was filed be20 1
cause an additional seventy-two whites made blacks a voting minority.
20
2
Similarly, the district court noted in City of Petersburgv. UnitedStates that
the annexation effected a "reversal" in the racial composition of the city. It
would be too rigid, however, to focus too closely on the population percentage
balance itself, because the ultimate inquiry is the effect that an annexation
predictably will have on the minority voters' ability to elect the candidate of
their choice. Election results may show that a few additional white voters
could destroy the fragile victory margins that minority candidates had enjoyed. Viewed in this light, an objection to a Fairfield, Alabama annexation
provides a more precise analysis:
Where, as here, voter registration is fairly evenly divided between the
races, there is a pattern of racial bloc voting and the election statistics
for the most recent municipal elections in 1972 demonstrate relatively narrow margins of victory by white over black candidates, the
addition of a few hundred white voters can have a significant diluting
impact on black voting strength.203
Even with the most sophisticated analysis of election returns, an impermissible result can be achieved through a series of annexations, each of which
is de minimis if taken individually. Therefore, if an annexation is one of seveffect
eral that decrease the minority population percentage, their cumulative
2 4
should be examined lest the Act be frustrated by piecemeal changes.
Generally, the objection letters reflect a healthy concern for this cumula199. See, e.g., letters to Greenville, N.C. (Apr. 7, 1980); Rocky Mount, N.C. (June 9, 1978)
(withdrawing objection of Dec. 9, 1977); objection letters to San Antonio, Tex. (Apr. 2, 1976);
Shreveport, La. (Mar. 31, 1976); letter to Rome, Ga. (Oct. 20, 1975) (withdrawing objection of
Aug. 1, 1975); objection letter to Bessemer, Ala. (Sept. 12, 1975). The district court made a similar
de minimis finding in City of Rome, 472 F. Supp. at 247.
200. See, e.g., objection letters to Vicksburg, Miss. (Oct. 1, 1976) (black population reduced
from 49.7% to 45.1%); San Antonio, Tex. (Apr. 2, 1972) (Mexican-American population reduced
from 53.1% to 51.1%).
201. Objection letter to Newellton, La. (June 12, 1973). See also objection letters to Jackson,
Miss. (Dec. 3, 1976) (withdrawn July 23, 1981); Lake Providence, La. (Dec. 1, 1972) (withdrawn
May 21, 1982).
202. 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (D.D.C. 1972) (per curiam), afj'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
203. Objection letter to Fairfield, Ala. (Apr. 16, 1975). In contrast, the Attorney General recently withdrew his objection to a 1972 annexation because in the intervening decade the black
population had increased to over 70% and achieved significant electoral successes. Letter to Lake
Providence, La. (May 21, 1982).
204. City ofRome, 472 F. Supp. at 247.
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tive impact. Recently, for example, the district court held that the consolida-

tion of Port Arthur, Texas with two adjacent communities and the subsequent
annexation of other areas were to be treated together because they had an

"indivisible cumulative impact. ' 20 Under similar reasoning, the Attorney
General objected to a Jackson, Mississippi annexation in 1976 that continued
a trend dating back at least to 1960 of the annexation of areas of
primarily white population, which has the effect of counteracting the
impact of an otherwise growing black population percentage ...
But for this series of annexations, the black population in the City of
20 6
Jackson would be approaching a majority.

An objection concerning Victoria, Texas noted that "the submitted annexations would decrease the combined minority percentage population by at least
one percent and that, taken cumulatively with all annexations since 1973, they
would decrease the population percentage by over three percent." 20 7 And in
1975, the Attorney General objected to an annexation that was the seventh
since 1964 to add an exclusively white residential area to Grenada,
Mississippi. 208
If the jurisdiction did not timely submit some of the annexations for section 5 preclearance, the cumulative effect of annexations should be even more
important for two reasons. 20 9 First, previous failures to comply with section 5
may be probative of invidious purpose. Second, unless all of the annexations
are considered together, the earlier annexations will escape section 5 scrutiny
altogether. As the district court explained in City ofRome, a jurisdiction could
frustrate section 5 review by making "piecemeal changes which are insignificant when taken separately but of considerable moment when added together. ' 210 The Supreme Court endorsed cumulative review of annexations in
205. Citp fPort Arthur, 517 F. Supp. at 1014.
206. Objection letter to Jackson, Miss. (Dec. 3, 1976). Without casting doubt on the reasoning
behind the original objection, the Attorney General withdrew it because of changed local circumstances. Letter to Jackson, Miss. (July 23, 1981).
207. Objection letter to Victoria, Tex. (Sept. 3, 1980). A similar objection letter stated, "Our
analysis of the submitted data indicates that the submitted annexations would reduce New Bern's
minority population percentage by over one percent and that, taken cumulatively with all annexations since 1970, they would decrease the minority population percentage by more than three
percent." Objection letter to New Bern, N.C. (Sept. 29, 1980) (withdrawn Oct. 5, 1981).
208. Objection letter to Grenada, Miss. (Feb. 5, 1975). The Attorney General also objected a
series of annexations that added 4,791 whites and 74 blacks to a city in a six-year period. Objection letter to Bessemer, Ala. (Sept. 12, 1975); letter to Bessemer, Ala. (July 7, 1982) . See also
objection letters to Lucedale, Miss. (July 27, 1982); Indianola, Miss. (June 1, 1981); Charleston,
S.C. (Sept. 20, 1974).
209. Preclearance of an earlier annexation does not foreclose an objection to a series of annexations if their cumulative effect has become clear in the interim. The Attorney General precleared
the 1967 annexation of a predominately white area to Statesboro, Georgia even though the annexation excluded a contiguous black community that had desired annexation. In 1979, when Statesboro proposed another all-white annexation, the Attorney General objected because it was "part
of a series of racially selective annexations" and would constitute an impermissible further dilution of black voting strength. With respect to the 1967 annexation, the objection volunteered that
the Attorney General's "conclusion at that time not to object was wrong." The objection noted
that the 1979 annexation would reduce the minority population percentage by another 0.9%, "resulting in a cumulative dilution of 11.0% within five to fifteen years." Objection letter to Statesboro, Ga. (Dec. 10, 1979).
210. 472 F. Supp. at 247.
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City of Rome,2 11 and it is also the Attorney General's policy. In 1975, when
Alabaster, Alabama submitted eleven annexations that the city had enacted in

1971, 1972, and 1973, the Attorney General responded:
I am not unmindful of the fact that our consideration under Section 5

regarding the individual annexations may have resulted in a judgment different from that announced above, had each annexation

been submitted promptly upon its completion. However, once confronted with the simultaneous [tardy] submission of 11 annexations,

and faced with the question of whether an impermissible dilution
under the law has occurred in Alabaster as the result of annexation,
we have no alternative but to examine the population of the annexed
territory as of the time of submission and to collectively consider the

annexations
to determine their effect under judicially enunciated
2 12
standards.
B.

Racially Selective Policies
Absence of a discriminatory purpose may be shown by "objectively verifi-

able, legitimate reasons for the annexation. '2 3 In some cases, however, the
selective policy,
annexation of a predominantly white area reflects a racially 214
analysis.
extended
without
expected
be
can
objection
an
and
In examining an annexation for a racially selective policy, a fruitful in-

quiry has been a comparison of the responses to requests for annexation from
white and minority areas. The Attorney General objected to an all-white annexation to Lake Providence, Louisiana, because the town council had rejected annexation requests from two predominantly black areas. 21 5
McClellanville, South Carolina had excluded adjacent black areas from an
annexation and had discouraged other black areas from formally requesting

annexation. 21 6 Similarly, several minority communities unsuccessfully had
sought annexation to Bessemer, Alabama, while "the great majority of annex-

ations of white areas [had] been achieved apparently with a minimum of, if
any, difficulty.

2 17

211. 446 U.S. at 186.
212. Objection letter to Alabaster, Ala. (July 7, 1975). Substantially identical language is in
the objection letter to Bessemer, Ala. (Sept. 12, 1975).
213. City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 375.
214. When the Attorney General sustained an objection to an annexation to Bessemer, Alabama, he pointed out that the only changed circumstance, an intervening court decision, had not
altered the cumulative dilutive effect of seven recent annexations or "the city's failure to annex
certain minority communities outside the city limits whose residents wished to be included in the
city. The court's decision does not even arguably affect this basis of our determination." Letter to
Bessemer, Ala. (Oct. 2, 1978). See also objection letters to Statesboro, Ga. (Dec. 10, 1979 and
Aug. 15, 1980).
215. Objection letter to Lake Providence, La. (Dec. 1, 1972).
216. Objection letter to McClellanville, S.C. (May 6, 1974).
217. Objection letter to Bessemer, Ala. (Sept. 12, 1975). An objection to a 1979 annexation to
Pleasant Grove, Alabama noted that "several identifiably black areas have petitioned for annexation to the City of Pleasant Grove, but.. . the city has taken no steps to annex those areas,
despite the passage of a considerable length of time." Objection letter to Pleasant Grove, Ala.
(Feb. 1, 1980). See also objection letter to McComb City, Miss. (May 30, 1973).
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An unusual configuration of an annexation also may evidence a racially
selective policy. One objection noted that racially selective annexations had
created "an area of concentrated black population immediately contiguous to
the City... [that] is now surrounded on three sides by the City of Grenada
[Mississippi] corporate boundaries." 2 18 Annexations to the Lumberton School
District, North Carolina "were outlined in a convoluted, meandering fashion
with the result that blacks and Indians were virtually excluded from the three
annexations in question. '21 9 In a recent annexation to Statesboro, Georgia,
"the extended city limits were carefully drawn to fence out" a predominantly
black area on the edge of the city that had desired annexation. 220 Similiar
reasoning prompted the Attorney General to withdraw an objection to an annexation in McClellanville, South Carolina after the town (1) passed a resolution that it would consider future annexation petitions without regard to race,
and (2) agreed to inform the Department of22Justice of any annexation petitions from black areas adjacent to the town. '
A racially selective policy is probably most evident when a white majority
goes beyond mere annexation and actually creates a new governmental unit in
a manner that excludes minorities. For example, the unincorporated community traditionally known as Hayneville, Alabama was itself predominantly
black and located in a county with a seventy-seven percent black population.
Although few blacks in Hayneville had been registered to vote before the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, black political strength grew dramatically in the following two years. In 1967 a predominantly white area within
Hayneville reacted to this trend by incorporating separately as a new town; the
222
Attorney General objected.
In Orange Grove, Mississippi, the Attorney General found that "racially
invidious considerations played a significant role both in the decision to create
a new city and in determining which areas and which people would be included." 223 The discriminatory incorporation would abridge the voting rights
of blacks both inside and outside the new city. As the Attorney General observed, "those few blacks who would be within the proposed corporate limits
218. Objection letter to Grenada, Miss. (Feb. 5, 1975).
219. Objection letter to Lumberton, N.C., School Dist. (June 2, 1975). See also letter to Lumberton, N.C., School Dist. (Jan. 25, 1982) (declining to withdraw the objection). The objections
involving Grenada, Mississippi and the Lumberton School District expressly relied on Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
220. Objection letter to Statesboro, Ga. (Dec. 10, 1979).
221. Letter to MeClellanville, S.C. (Oct. 21, 1974). The objection to annexations to Jackson,

Mississippi indicated that the Attorney General had precleared an earlier 1971 annexation only on
the "understanding that the city planned to include two specific black areas as part of then pending annexations." Objection letter to Jackson, Miss. (Dec. 3, 1976) (withdrawn July 23, 1981).
See also objection letters to Statesboro, Ga. (Aug. 15, 1980); Pleasant Grove, Ala. (Feb. 1,
1980); Statesboro, Ga. (Dec. 10, 1979). In an objection to annexations to Indianola, Mississippi,
the Attorney General offered to withdraw if the city adopted a different method of election or
"offset the dilutive effect of the annexation in question by annexing the black residential areas
adjacent to the city." Objection letter to Indianola, Miss. (June 1, 1981).
222. Objection letter to Hayneville, Ala. (Dec. 29, 1978). Incorporated Hayneville did not sub-

mit the incorporation to the Attorney General for § 5 preclearance until 11 years later, in 1978.
223. Objection letter to Orange Grove, Miss. (June 2, 1980).
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will be transferred from a governmental system, in which there is some promise of effective political participation through fairly drawn single-member districts, to one which does not hold such promise. 2 2 4 The Attorney General
objected to another incorporation because of an "irregular. . . boundary line
which circumvents
an area populated by blacks" who evidently had desired to
22 5
be included.
The Attorney General also has objected to the discriminatory creation of
predominantly white school districts. In Saluda County, South Carolina,
whites sought to form a new school district in order to avoid a desegregation
order. The district was to be formed through a referendum in which, contrary
to South Carolina law, only the residents of the proposed district rather than
all county residents would be allowed to vote. The Attorney General objected
because the referendum would "limit voting on a school question to a small
overwhelmingly white electorate where a county is in the process of desegre226
gating its educational facilities."
A similar objection blocked the proposed creation of the Westheimer Independent School District in Harris County, Texas. The new district "was first
proposed shortly after the 1969 HISD [Houston Independent School District]
elections where minority-backed candidates first gained control of the Board
and shortly after the HISD had been ordered to undertake substantial school
desegregation." 2 27 The Attorney General pointed out the discriminatory effect of creating a predominantly white district:
minority residents in the proposed Westheimer District will have no
realistic opportunity to achieve the sort of representation in the proposed Westheimer Independent School District that they now enjoy
in the Houston Independent School District. Finally, minority parents in the Houston Independent School District whose children, in
order to enjoy the benefits of a desegregated education, attend
schools located in what would be the Westheimer Independent
School District would be disfranchised with
respect to all matters re228
lating to the education of their children.
In a more unusual situation, the Attorney General objected to the reorganization of Todd and Shannon Counties in South Dakota. For many years,
state law had not permitted the residents of these predominantly Native American counties to vote for county officers in predominantly white Tripp and Fall
River Counties, which provided them with government services. In Little
Thunder v. South Dakota,229 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held this
224. Id.
225. Objection letter to Pearl, Miss. (Nov. 21, 1973) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.

339 (1960)).
226. Objection letter to Saluda County, S.C. (Nov. 13, 1972).
227. Objection letter to Westheimer, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Jan. 13, 1977).
228. Id. See also objection letter to Victoria, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 2, 1976). The
Attorney General has objected twice when school boards tried to decrease minority participation
(as a percentage of the electorate) in school board elections. See objection letters to Ouachita
Parish, La., School Bd. (March 7, 1977); Robeson County, N.C., Bd. of Educ. (Dec. 29, 1975).
229. 518 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1975).
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voting restriction unconstitutional and thus provided the Native Americans
with their first access to county government. The white residents of Tripp and
Fall River Counties then sought to nullify Little Thunder by severing the formal relationship between the white and Native American counties. The Attorney General objected to this scheme because the new Native American
counties would be nominally independent but actually dependent on the
neighboring white counties since their revenues would be insufficient to carry
230
out normal government functions.
C Method of Election
When demographic information indicates the potential for discrimination, but there is no other evidence of a racially selective policy, annexation
must be examined "in the context of the local electoral system, with due consideration to the historic patterns of minority electoral participation."'23 1 More
specifically, the test is whether the election system will reflect fairly the
strength of the minority community as it exists after the annexation. 2 32 An
objection is appropriate if the method of election and the traditional indicators
of vote dilution suggest that a predominantly white annexation would diminish the political access of minorities.
City ofPetersburgand City of Richmond v. United States23 3 illustrate this
analysis. Petersburg, Virginia had a city council consisting of five members
who were elected at-large to four-year terms that expired at staggered two-year
intervals. A candidate had to receive a majority of the vote to win, and runoff
elections were frequent. After the Attorney General objected to an annexation,234 the city sought a declaratory judgment. The district court found that a
long history of racial segregation and discrimination had resulted in a "dramatic polarization of the races in Petersburg with respect to voting." 23 5 The
city council, which had always had a white majority, had been "generally unresponsive to some of the expressed needs and desires of the black community. '236 Under these circumstances, the district court found that "[tihe
annexation . . . to the City of Petersburg dilutes the weight, strength and
power of the votes of the black voters in the City. . . . The dilution here has

occurred as a result of the annexation in the context of at-large elections and
bloc voting by race."'2 37 The district court concluded that it would approve the
annexation only if the city changed from at-large to single-member district
elections.

238

In City ofRichmond, the annexation in question reduced the city's black
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Objection letter to the State of South Dakota (Oct. 22, 1979).
Objection letter to Jackson, Miss. (Dec. 3, 1976) (withdrawn July 23, 1981).
Ciy of t'chmond, 422 U.S. at 371.
422 U.S. 358 (1975).
Objection letter to Petersburg, Va. (Feb. 22, 1972).

235. 354 F. Supp. at 1025.
236. Id at 1026.
237. Id at 1028-29.
238. Id. at 1031.
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population from fifty-two to forty-two percent. Relying heavily on the district
court's decision in City of Petersburg, the Supreme Court found that this re-

duction, while it might impermissibly dilute the black vote in the context of atlarge elections and racial bloc voting, would survive section 5 scrutiny if the

city adopted single-member district elections. 23 9 More recently, in City of
Rome the Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that an annexation would have a discriminatory effect because of "three vote-dilutive factors:
the at-large electoral system, the residency requirement for officeholders, and
24 °
the high degree of racial bloc voting."

In accord with these court cases, the Attorney General has considered the

dilutive effect of at-large elections and anti-single-shot provisions in determining the conditions for preclearing an annexation. The consistent failure of

minority-supported candidates is particularly important. 24 1 The following

language from a New Bern, North Carolina objection letter is typical:
In addition to evidence of a general pattern of racially polarized voting in New Bern municipal elections, we have noted that, with the
exception of only one black candidate, no black of the many who
have run has ever won election to the New Bern board of aldermen
and majority vote runoff
under the at-large, residency requirement,
24 2
features of the city's electoral system.
Most objections have suggested that preclearance is appropriate when the
traditional vote dilution factors are present if and only if the jurisdiction institutes single-member district elections. 243 The Attorney General at least twice
rejected plans combining at-large and district elections and insisted on singlemember district plans. 2 " Similarly, the district court in Citv of Petersburg
239. 422 U.S. at 370.
240. 446 U.S. at 187.
241. See, e.g., objection letters to Mendenhall, Miss. (Jan. 12, 1981) ("no black candidate has
ever won election"); Victoria, Tex. (Sept. 3,1980) ("no black or Mexican American has ever won
election to the Victoria City Council"); Statesboro, Ga. (Dec. 10, 1979) ("No black has ever been
elected to city office, although black candidates have run on several occasions"); Houston, Tex.
(June 11, 1979) ("only one black, and no Mexican-American has ever served on the eight-member
City Council under the present electoral system"); Jackson, Miss. (Dec. 3, 1976) ("no black has
ever been elected to the Council, although several have been candidates") (withdrawn July 23,
1981); Monroe, Ga. (Oct. 13, 1976) ("no black has ever served on the City Council"); Vicksburg,
Miss. (Oct. 1, 1976) (black primary candidates had been unsuccessful).
242. Objection letter to New Bern, N.C. (Sept. 29, 1980) (withdrawn Oct. 5, 1981). See also
letter to New Bern, N.C. (Sept. 4, 1981); objection letter to Sidon, Miss. (Oct. 28, 1977).
243. For example:
Should the City of Mendenhall adopt an electoral system that would afford black
voters an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, the Attorney General would
withdraw this objection. Our analysis has shown that the adoption of a fairly drawn
single-member district plan would afford black voters such a fair opportunity.
Objection letter to Mendenhall, Miss. (Jan. 12, 1981).
See also letter to San Antonio, Tex. (Jan. 24, 1977) (withdrawing objection of Apr. 2, 1976
after city adopted single-member district elections); letter to Charleston, S.C. (May 13, 1975)
(withdrawing objection of Sept. 20, 1974 after city adopted single-member district elections).
244. Objection letters to Port Arthur, Tex. (July 23, 1980); Savannah, Ga. (June 27, 1978). In
another case, however, the Attorney General withdrew an earlier objection because the city
adopted a hybrid city council with nine single-member districts and five at-large seats. Letter to
Houston, Tex. (Sept. 21, 1979). See also City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987
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on elimrequired single-member district elections, rather than simply insisting
245
ination of the majority vote requirement and staggered terms.
. In several instances, however, the district court and the Attorney General
have suggested that the jurisdiction may retain at-large elections after the annexation if it eliminates anti-single-shot provisions. Several annexations to
Rome, Georgia prompted an objection to the city's at-large elections and antisingle-shot provisions. 246 The Attorney General offered to reconsider "should
the city undertake again to elect.

. .

by a simple plurality-win system,. .. or

from fairly drawn single-member districts. '2 47 The Attorney General then
withdrew the objection after the city had eliminated practically all of the antisingle-shot provisions, because single-shot voting would remain an effective
minority electoral strategy even if the city maintained at-large elections. In
withdrawing the objection he noted "that the abandonment of the majority
vote, numbered post and staggered term procedures for these elections, together with the previous reduction in the number of residency districts for the
city commission elections, will give black voters a fair chance to elect candi249
dates of their choice." 248 The district court reached a similiar conclusion.
Thus, the Attorney General and the district court have suggested that
they may preclear an annexation and allow at-large elections to continue if
minority voters can use single-shot voting effectively in that community. Theoretically and under limited circumstances, this may be consistent with the general rule in City of Richmond and City of Petersburg, which required that
elections in the enlarged city "fairly recognize" the political potential of the
affected minority. Thus, the viability of single-shot voting under the local circumstances is relevant to whether at-large elections can meet this test without
fairly drawn single-member districts.
If City of Rome suggests that at-large elections may continue after a dilutive annexation, that suggestion must be confined to the facts in that case. In
City ofRome, blacks arguably had not suffered the "total exclusion" from the
(D.D.C. 1981) (denying § 5 preclearance but declining to require single-member districts; city
permitted to develop own plan),prob.juris noted, 102 S. Ct. 1272 (1982).
245. 354 F. Supp. at 1031.
246. Letter to Rome, Ga. (Oct. 20, 1975).
247. Id
248. Letter to Rome, Ga. (Aug. 5, 1980). See also letter to Rome, Ga. (Aug. 12, 1976).
249. City of Rome, 472 F. Supp. at 246-49. Similarly, an objection to annexations to New
Bern, N.C. stated:
Should the City of New Bern adopt an electoral system that would afford black
voters an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, the Attorney General will con-

sider withdrawing this objection. Options which the city may wish to consider include
the adoption of a fairly drawn single-member district plan or the removal of the majority
vote andresidency requirements. Either of these options holds the promise of providing

black voters with an opportunity to achieve representation reasonably equivalent to their
political strength in the enlarged community and, therefore, could provide a basis for the
withdrawal of the objection here interposed.
Objection letter to New Bern, N.C. (Sept. 29, 1980) (emphasis added). See also objection letter to
Lucedale, Miss. (July 27, 1982). Cf. the analysis applying to at-large elections, discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 127-50, especially objection letters to Baton Rouge, La. (Feb. 7, 1980);
Long County, Ga. (July 16, 1976).

1983]

VOTING RIGHTS ACT

political process that was evident in City of Petersburg.250 The district court

pointed out that there had been no direct legal barrier to black voting for some
time. White officials were somewhat responsive to the black community, and

white candidates sought black support.25 In addition, the local circumstances

suggested that single-shot voting might afford blacks the degree of representation required by City of Petersburg and City of Richmond.252 The district
court, however, gave little weight to evidence that few blacks had run for city
office, that no black candidates had ever been elected, and that there was racial
bloc voting.2 53 Despite this evidence of political exclusion, City of Rome

should not be read to modify the rule that a city must take steps "to neutralize
to the extent possible any adverse effect upon the political participation of

black voters.' '2 54 Most annexation objections have arisen amid numerous
traditional vote dilution indicators of the sort that were present in City of
255
Petersburg.

This inquiry into how far a jurisdiction must go in neutralizing the effects
of an annexation should recall City of Lockhart and the purpose of undertak-

ing a detailed examination of voting patterns in the jurisdiction prior to the
section 5 submission. Once again, the conflict is between the retrogression test

and Beer's more general invitation to consider equal political access as defined
in the constitutional vote dilution cases. 256 The retrogression test could be

interpreted to require different degrees of postannexation "neutralizing" measures, depending on the level of political access that minority voters enjoyed
before the annexation. Under this reasoning, little would need to be done to
enhance or preserve the position of minority voters who had little political

access before the annexation. In turn, little would need to be done to neutralize the effects of the annexation.

Faced with this issue, the courts and the Attorney General have not extended the retrogression test to annexations and consolidations. This response is evident, first, from City of Petersburg and City of Rome, each of
which turned primarily on constitutional vote dilution indicators. 257 More di250. In City ofRichmond, the Supreme Court used the phrase "total exclusion" to refer to the
discriminatory potential of the annexation in City of Petersburg. 422 U.S. at 370.
251. 472 F. Supp. at 224-25.
252. The district court pointed out that the Attorney General had reached essentially the same
conclusion. Id. at 248-49. The court also stated that because at-large elections had some advantages, a "compelling showing" would be required before a court would order adoption of singlemember districts, particularly when at-large elections had been a long-standing tradition. Id
This dictum is difficult to reconcile with City of Petersburg and City of Richmond, both of which
indicate that the decision to condition § 5 preclearance on adoption of single-member districts
depends entirely on whether the minority can achieve effective political access in at-large elections. See City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 370-71.
253. 472 F, Supp. at 225-27.
254. City of Petersburg,354 F. Supp. at 1031 (emphasis added). The dissent in City of Richmond stressed this "to the extent possible" language in endorsing an alternative plan that would
have provided for greater black representation. City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 388-89 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also City of Richmond, 376 F. Supp. at 1356-57.
255. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 241-44.
256. The most important of these factors are listed supra text accompanying notes 41-50.
257. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 183-87; City ofPetersburg,354 F. Supp. at 1025-31.
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rectly, the district court specifically refused to apply the retrogression test to
annexations and consolidations in City of PortArthur v. United States.2

8

In

that case, Port Arthur, Texas sought section 5 preclearance for several annexations and consolidations that were part of a general boundary expansion. The
Attorney General objected to the city's section 5 submission, 259 and the city
turned to the district court. The city urged the court to apply the retrogression
test to measure any effect on minority political power against preexpansion
minority representation. The district court responded by rejecting the argument "that the simple analysis used in Beer v. UnitedStates to test the effect of
voting procedure changes can be transferred to complex situations involving
consolidations and annexations. '2 60 The court explained that "procedure
changes" must be distinguished from boundary enlargements because the former affect an unchanged population, while citizens added by a boundary exthe failure of the old inhabitants to achieve
pansion "should not suffer for
26 1
proportional representation.
Although City ofPortArthurdirectly affects only annexations and consolidations, it is part of an emerging pattern. Together with Apache County,
Wilkes County, and City ofLockhart, it limits the use of prior levels of minor-

ity political participation as reference points for section 5 analysis. Instead, all
four cases rely on constitutional vote dilution factors to establish an ideal hypothetical reference point of equal political access for minorities. Against this
reference point, a covered jurisdiction has the burden of proving lack of unconstitutional purpose.
VI. REDISTRICTING
In Georgia v. United States262 the United States Supreme Court held that
section 5 applies to legislative redistricting. 263 Clearly, redistricting has a significant impact on the ability of voters to elect the candidate of their choice,
but there is no easy standard for determining when a redistricting plan is discriminatory. As the following discussion indicates, the Attorney General and
the district court generally have decided section 5 submissions by looking to
the factors264that traditionally have governed constitutional reapportionment
litigation.
258. 517 F. Supp. 987 (D.D.C. 1981),prob.jurl. noted, 102 S. Ct. 1272 (1982).
259. Objection letter to Port Arthur, Tex. (Mar. 24, 1978).
260. 517 F. Supp. at 1012 n.149.
261. 1d.
262. 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
263. Id. at 531-35 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 141-44 (1971), for the general
proposition that redistricting has significant vote-dilutive potential). The Court in subsequent
cases has held, however, that § 5 does not apply to a redistricting plan that a court formulates and
adopts. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 138 (1981); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 691
(1971) (per curiam). See also Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 542 (1978); East Carroll Parish
School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 638 n.6 (1976).
264. For example, in objecting to a reapportionment plan for the Corpus Christi, Tex., Independent School District, the Attorney General announced the following standard:
The court must then look to the matter of whether the redisticting plan, whether adopted
by legislative processes or proposed to be adopted and ordered by the court, will con-
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Underrepresentationof Minority Districts

Redistricting plans often have prompted objections because they contain
a predominantly minority district that is overpopulated, which results in the

underrepresentation of minority voters in those districts. 265 For example, a
plan for Batesville, Mississippi contained one overpopulated ward with a

black majority and two substantially underpopulated wards that were virtually
all-white. The plan deviated from districts of equal population by fifty-four
percent.2 66 A plan for Tate County, Mississippi would have underrepresented
blacks and overrepresented whites by 33.8 percent. 267 The 1980 census data

for Holly Springs, Mississippi showed that population statistics provided by
black wards were overpopulated by an overthe city were inaccurate and that268
all deviation of seventy percent.
Minority underrepresentation frequently has been traced to a suspect re-

districting methodology. One redistricting plan simply used a house count
multiplied by the average number of persons per house, even though the aver-

age white household was smaller than the average black household. 269 Minority underrepresentation also has occurred because plans are based on

registered voters rather than on voting age population. Constitutional vote
dilution cases have indicated that, while the use of voter registration figures is

not per se impermissible, it may violate the equal protection clause if the distribution of registered voters is not representative of the population as a
tinue in effect an existent denial of access to the minority. Both the Supreme Court and
this circuit have firmly held that where a reapportionment plan is formulated in the
context of an existent intentional denial of access by minority group members to the
political process, and would perpetuate that denial, the plan is constitutionally unacceptable because it is a denial of rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.
Objection letter to Corpus Christi, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 16, 1980) (quoting Kirksey, 554
F.2d at 143). See generaly Bickerstaff, supra note 2, at 644-49.
In some cases, the Attorney General has not reached the merits of a redistricting submission
because the enabling legislation that authorized local governments to redistrict had not received
§ 5 preclearance. See objection letters to St. Mary Parish, La. (Jan. 12, 1972); Caddo Parish, La.,
School Bd. (Oct. 8,1971); St. Helena Parish, La. (Oct. 8,1971); Natchitoches Parish, La. (Sept. 20,
1971); East Feliciana Parish, La. (Sept. 20, 1971); Webster Parish, La. (Aug. 6, 1971); Bossier
Parish, La. (July 30, 1971); Jefferson Davis Parish, La. (July 23, 1971); St. Charles Parish, La. (July
22, 1971); Assumption Parish, La. (July 9, 1971); Franklin Parish, La. (July 8, 1971). All of these
objections were based on the objection to the enabling legislation. See objection letter to the State
of Louisiana (June 26, 1969) (objecting to Act No. 445, 1968 La. Acts 1001 (codified as subsequently amended at LA. Rev. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1221, :1224 (West Supp. 1982))). See also Dyer v.
Love, 307 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
265. Because § 5 concerns discrimination against racial or language minorities rather than
"one-person, one-vote" challenges, the Attorney General may preclear a redistricting submission
that is unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., objection letter to Charleston,
S.C. (Feb. 18, 1975).
266. Objection letter to Batesville, Miss. (Sept. 29, 1980).
267. See objection letter to Tate County, Miss. (Dec. 3, 1971).
268. Objection letter to Holly Springs, Miss. (June 9, 1981). Other objections refer to minority
underrepresentation without giving specific figures. See, e.g., objection letters to Corpus Christi,
Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 16, 1980); Tripp & Todd Counties, S.D. (Oct. 26, 1978); Canton,
Miss. (Apr. 13, 1977). The smallest deviation to prompt a § 5 objection to a redistricting plan has
been 13.8%. Objection letter to College Park, Ga. (Dec. 9, 1977).
269. Objection letter to Canton, Miss. (Apr. 13, 1977). A similar error led to an objection in
Barbour County, Alabama. Objection letter to Barbour County, Ala. (Nov. 16, 1981).
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whole. 270 Generally, minorities have a lower registration rate than whites, so
on registration alone is likely to result in minority
redistricting based 27
underrepresentation.

t

B. Minimizing the Number of Minority-ControlledDistricts

Redistricting also has prompted objections when it has minimized the
number of districts in which minority voters can elect candidates of their
choice. In "borderline majority districts," for example, minority voters constitute a slim numerical majority, but whites retain control. This situation occurs
in part because minority voters tend to register and vote at a lower rate than
272
whites as a result of past discrimination and lower socio-economic status.
Also, a greater proportion of the minority population is likely to be under
voting age. 273 Constitutional cases have long recognized that these borderline
majority districts may represent improper vote dilution under such
circumstances.

274

Applying these constitutional priniciples, the district court held in a section 5 declaratory judgment action that a plan with borderline majority districts had a discriminatory effect: "a district should contain a black population
of at least 65 percent or a black [voting age population] of at least 60 percent to
provide black voters with an opportunity to elect a candidate of their
choice." 275 Similarly, in Donnell v. United States276 the district court found

that a redistricting plan for Warren County, Mississippi had a discriminatory
effect because no district had a voting age population greater than fifty-eight
percent black. 277 Of course, the result may be different where minority voting
approaches the rate for whites, or where there are other special circumstances.

In City ofPortArthurthe district court found that blacks probably could elect
the candidate of their choice in a district with a population 61.1 percent black
and a voting age population 55 percent black. Black and white voter turnout
in Port Arthur were approximately equal, and a Hispanic population of 2.7
270. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 94-95 (1966). Accord Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 115
n.7 (1971); Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927, 937 (5th Cir. 1978); Robinson v. Commissioners
Court, 505 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 1974). The use of voting age population is preferred. City of
Rome, 446 U.S. at 186 & n.22; Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 135 (1976); Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927, 937, (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979). See also UnitedJewish
Orgs., 430 U.S. at 160-62; Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 149-50; Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of Election
Comm'rs, 502 F.2d 621, 626 (5th Cir. 1974).
271. E.g., objection letters to Tripp & Todd Counties, S.D. (Oct. 26, 1978); Aransas County,
Tex. (April 28, 1978); Uvalde County, Tex. (Oct. 13, 1976); Walter County, Tex. (July 27, 1976);
Crockett County, Tex. (July 7, 1976).
272. See Hale County v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1206, 1216-17 (D.D.C. 1980). See also
the discussion of general criteria, supra text 'ccompanying notes 41-50, and the discussion of
Burns v. Richardson, Ely v. Klahr, and their progeny, supra text accompanying notes 269-7 1.
273. Beer, 425 U.S. at 134 n.4.
274. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 150 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977); Moore, 502 F.2d at 624.
275. Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D.D.C. 1979), a 'd, 444 U.S. 1050
(1980). See generally Bickerstaff, supra note 2, at 668.
276. No. 78-0392 (D.D.C. July 31, 1979), aJ'd,444 U.S. 1059 (1980).
277. No. 78-0392, slip op. at 8. See also D. HUNTER, supra note 17, at 26.
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278
percent further reduced any advantage enjoyed by whites.
The Attorney General's objection letters have reflected the district court's
approach to borderline majority districts. In one case, four of the seven coun-

cil districts in a redistricting plan for Bamberg County, South Carolina had a
black population majority, but only two had a black voting age population
majority.279 The Attorney General recently objected to a redistricting plan for
Barbour County, Alabama that divided the county's forty-four percent black
population into three districts. Each of the three districts had a borderline
and the
black majority, but two had a white voting age population majority
280

third had only slightly over fifty percent black registered voters.

Other redistricting plans have minimized impermissibly the number of

minority-controlled districts by fragmenting minority population concentrations. Again, section 5 determinations have relied on the same factors that

control constitutional cases. For example, several objections28 ' have relied on

Robinson v. Commissioners Court,2 82 which held unconstitutional a plan that
voting community. 283

would "fragment what could otherwise be a cohesive

The Attorney General issued a section 5 objection because a plan for Gre-

nada County, Mississippi was "drawn in a manner which unnecessarily fragments two cognizable black neighborhoods in the City of Grenada, thus

diluting or minimizing the voting strength of blacks." 284 A plan for Terrell
County, Texas would have impermissibly diluted minority voting strength "by
community in Sanderson
unnecessarily dividing the Mexican-American
28 5
among three commissioner precincts.

278. 517 F. Supp. at 1016 n.160.
279. Objection letter to Bamberg County, S.C. (July 30, 1976). The Attorney General withdrew this objection on November 1, 1976, because the redistricting plan enjoyed widespread support in the black community and had resulted in black victories in recent elections. See discussion
of minority participation and support, infra text accompanying notes 313-17.
See also objection letters to Madison Parish, La. (Aug. 16, 1982) (black population reduced
from 61.4% to 54%); Petersburg, Va. (Mar. 1, 1982) (black population percentage reduced from
69.6% to 61.5% and from 71.2% to 61.6%); State of Georgia (Senate and House) (Feb. 11, 1982)
(numerous borderline black majority districts); State of Texas (Congress) (Jan. 29, 1982)(MexicanAmerican population divided into one 52.9% and one 80.4% district); State of Texas (Senate and
House) (Jan. 25, 1982) (reduction of minority population percentages); State of North Carolina
(House) (Jan. 20, 1982) (black population in three-member district reduced from 57.5% to 51.7%);
Attala County, Miss. (Sept. 3, 1974); letter to the State of Georgia (Dec. 13, 1973); objection letter
to the State of Louisiana (Aug. 20, 1971) (district with black population majority but black voting
age population minority).
280. Objection letter to Barbour County, Ala. (July 21, 1981).
281. E.g., objection letters to Harrison County, Tex. (Aug. 8, 1978); Aransas County, Tex.
(Apr. 28, 1978); Edwards County, Tex. (Apr. 26, 1978); Crockett County, Tex. (Nov. 9, 1977).
282. 505 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1974).
283. Id at 679. See also Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 149, 152; Moore, 502 F.2d at 622-24; Mississiopi,
490 F. Supp. at 581-82.
284. Objection letter to Grenada County, Miss. (Aug. 9, 1973). A later redistricting objection
in the same community was based on substantially identical reasoning. Objection letter to Grenada, Miss. (Mar. 30, 1976).
285. Objection letter to Terrell County, Tex. (Dec. 27, 1978). See also objection letters to
Marion County, S.C. (Aug. 16, 1982); Conecuh County, Ala. (July 26, 1982); State of New York
(June 22, 1982); State of Mississippi (Congress) (Mar. 30, 1982); State of Arizona (Mar. 8, 1982);
Uvalde County, Tex. (Feb. 18, 1982 & Jan. 22, 1982); State of Georgia (House, Senate, and Congress) (Feb. I1, 1982); State of Texas .(House and Senate) (Jan. 25, 1982); Barbour County, Ala.
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Even if a plan does not disperse a cognizable majority concentration, it
still has prompted an objection if it distributes minority voters among most or
all of the districts in the jurisdiction. For example, in a plan for Edwards
been
County, Texas, "the Mexican American population in the county [had]
'28 6 Simialmost evenly distributed among the four commissioner precincts."
larly, in a plan for the Texas House of Representatives, "[tihe location of single-member district lines [in Jefferson County] almost evenly divides the

population among the county's three new single-member
county's minority
'287
districts.

A redistricting plan also minimizes the number of minority-controlled
districts when it confines minority voters to a few all-minority districts. For
example, Crockett County, Texas created an eighty-four percent MexicanAmerican district and reduced the Mexican-American majority to a borderline
fifty-eight percent in another district, where a Mexican-American candidate
lost to a white candidate in a runoff.288 In Many, Louisiana a plan concentrated most of the forty percent black population into one all-black district.
"[T]he rest of the black concentration is fragmented to the point where they
represent, at best, a 42% minority among their proportions in the remaining
four districts."

'289

C. Submerging Minorities Into Multimember Districts

Multimember districts may dilute minority voting strength in contravention of constitutional standards when multimember districts minimize minority political influence. 290 In recognition of the dangers inherent in
multimember districts, courts in constitutional cases have expressed a prefer-

(Nov. 16, 1981); New York, N.Y. (Oct. 27, 1981); State of Virginia (July 17 & July 31, 1981);
Barbour County, Ala. (July 27, 1981); Jim Wells County, Tex. (Aug. 12, 1980); Medina County,
Tex. (Dec. 11, 1979); Walthall County, Miss. (Nov. 27, 1978); Harrison County, Tex. (Aug. 8,
1978); Aransas County, Tex. (Apr. 28, 1978); Many, La. (Apr. 13, 1976); State of Texas (Jan. 23,
1976); Cochise College Bd., Ariz. (Feb. 3, 1975); Attala County, Miss. (Sept. 3, 1974); Bronx,
Kings, and New York Counties, N.Y. (Apr. 1, 1974); Warren County, Miss. (Feb. 13, 1973); Lafayette Parish, La., School Bd. (June 16, 1972); State of Louisiana (Aug. 20, 1971). See also letter
to the State of Georgia (Dec. 13, 1973).
286. Objection letter to Edwards County, Tex. (Apr. 26, 1978) (citing Kirkse, & Robinson).
287. Objection letter to the State of Texas (House) (Jan. 23, 1976). See also objection letters to
the State of Virginia (Mar. 12, 1982); Harrison County, Tex. (Aug. 8, 1978) (black population
evenly distributed among all districts).
288. Objection letter to Crockett County, Tex. (Nov. 9,1977) (citing White, Robinson, Moore).
standard in Mississiopi,discussed supra at text accompanying notes 275-80.
See the minimum 60%7o
289. Objection letter to Many, La. (Apr. 13, 1976). See also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52
(1964); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, at 219, (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980);
objection letters to Conecuh County, Ala. (July 26, 1982); Dougherty County, Ga. (July 12, 1982);
State of New York (June 22, 1982); Monroe, La., School Bd. (May 18, 1982); State of Alabama
(May 6, 1982); State of Virginia (Mar. 12, 1982); State of Texas (Congress) (Jan. 29, 1982); Nueces
County, Tex. (Mar. 24, 1978); Bronx, Kings, and New York Counties, N.Y. (Apr. 1, 1974).
290. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-69 (1972); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 402 U.S. 124,
143-44 (1971); Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 152; Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1973);
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aJd on other groundsper
curiam sub nonm East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). See also the
discussion of multimember districts and at-large elections supra at text accompanying notes 10626.
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ence for single-member districts. 29 1
In similar fashion, the Attorney General has objected to redistricting
plans that submerge minority voters in multimember districts. For example, a
plan for the Louisiana Legislature combined several majority black and majority white districts into double-member districts. While each district had a
borderline black population majority, whites retained effective control. 292 A
similar objection to the redistricting of Ascension Parish, Louisiana noted,
"[E]ach of the three areas of black population in the Parish north of the Mississippi River, that is, the prior Ward 5, Ward 6 and census enumeration district number 12 have each been aligned with larger areas of white population
creating three multi-member districts which have controlling white majorities. ' ' 293 A proposed plan for Pointe Coupee Parish, Louisiana merged two
wards with a "substantial black majority and a number of black elected officials" with two other wards, thus creating two majority-white, double-member

districts.

294

291. The judiciary should formulate multimember district plans only under special circumstances. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. at 139; Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66; Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S.
at 415; East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. at 638-39; Chapman v. Meier, 420
U.S. 1,26-27 (1975); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,333 (1973); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690,
692 (1971); Wallace v. House, 538 F.2d 1138, 1142 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. detnied, 431 U.S. 965
(1977); Moore, 502 F.2d at 627. The Fifth Circuit found such special circumstances present in
Corder v. Kirksey, 639 F.2d 1191, 1195-96 (5th Cir. 1981) (state policy favoring five-member
boards of education justified electing one member at large where there were only four logical
single-member districts).
292. See objection letter to the State of Louisiana (Senate and House) (Aug. 20, 1971). See the
discussion of borderline majority districts, supra text accompanying notes 272-80.
293. Objection letter to Ascension Parish, La. (July 23, 1971). See also objection letter to
Ascension Parish, La., School Bd. (Apr. 20, 1972) (virtually identical grounds).
294. Objection letter to Pointe Coupee Parish, La. (Aug. 9, 1971). In an objection letter to the
State of Virginia, the Attorney General objected to a multimember district in the City of Norfolk
because two single-member districts would have had substantial black majorities. Objection letter
to the State of Virginia (Mar. 12, 1982). Moreover, the stated rationale for separate treatment of
Norfolk (the presence of a large population that did not vote locally) was novel and was not
applied uniformly throughout the state. In an objection letter to the State of North Carolina, the
Attorney General objected to minority vote dilution through the use of multimember districts in
six counties. Objection letter to the State of North Carolina (Senate and Congress) (Dec. 7, 1981).
See also objection letter to Conecuh County, Ala. (Sept. 14, 1981) ("submerged into larger
multi-member districts sizeable black concentrations so as to dilute the minority voting strength
that those voters would have enjoyed under a continued single-member district plan"); Rapides
Parish, La. (Dec. 24, 1975); Evangeline Parish, La., School Bd. (June 25 & July 26, 1974) ("submerging still sizable concentrations of black voters into majority-white, multi-member districts");
Jefferson Davis Parish, La. (June 4, 1974) ("cognizable Negro minority is located within proposed
District Two in 3uch a manner and in sufficient number that their vote is minimized when cast and
counted with the larger number of votes cast by the racial majority in the multi-member district");
Twiggs County, Ga. (Aug. 7, 1972); East Feliciana Parish, La., School Bd. (Apr. 22, 1972) ("significant black concentrations have been joined with heavily white areas"); State of South Carolina
(Mar. 6, 1972 & Feb. 14, 1974); State of Georgia (Mar. 3, 1972).
The Attorney General also has objected to a North Carolina law that provided that no county
could be divided in the formation of a state legislative district. Act of May 31, 1967, ch. 640, § 1,
1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 704, 705 (ratified as N.C. CONsT. art. II, § 5(3)). The objection noted that
the provision had led to the use of large multimember districts, which in the context of racial bloc
voting "necessarily submerges cognizable minority population concentrations into larger white
electorates." Objection letter to the State of North Carolina (Nov. 30, 1981) (citing Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
Adherence to the 1967 law and the resulting "submergence of minority voting strength" were
important factors in the Attorney General's objection to the redistricting of the North Carolina
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As with at-large elections, objections to multimember redistricting have
been more likely if the jurisdiction also has anti-single-shot provisions to exacerbate vote dilution.2 95 An objection to a multimember district plan for the
Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, School Board noted:
The dilutive effect of the multi-member district device on the black
population concentrations in Lafayette Parish is magnified by the
election of the representatives in each district on a staggered basisfor a majority of
essentially a post system-and the2 requirement
96
votes to elect in a primary election.
In objecting to South Carolina's State House reapportionment, the Attorney
General noted "the submergence of significant concentrations of Negro voters
into large majority-white multi-member districts and the magnification of this
dilution of Negro voting strength by the numbered post and majority vote
requirement."

297

D. Availabiity of Alternative Plans

Objections also have been more likely if alternatives were available that
could have avoided the objectionable features of the submitted plan. For example, the Attorney General objected to a redistricting plan for the Cochise
College Board, Arizona that fragmented the Spanish-surnamed population bedistricting could achieve
cause "other logical, rational and compact alternative
29 8
population equality without such a result."
At a minimum, the availability of alternative redistricting plans that
would provide minority voters with a greater opportunity to elect candidates
of their choice is relevant to whether the submitted plan has the effect of diluting minority voting strength. The rejection of alternatives also may evidence
an invidious purpose.299 The inference of improper purpose is strongest
where districts have unusual configurations, particularly if their shapes disreLegislature.following the 1980 Census. See objection letter to the State of North Carolina (House)
(Jan. 20, 1982); State of North Carolina (Senate and Congress) (Dec. 7, 1981).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 151-89 (discussing anti-single-shot provisions in the
context of at-large and multimember elections).
296. Objection letter to Lafayette Parish, La., School Bd. (June 16, 1972).
297. Objection letter to the State of South Carolina (Feb. 14, 1974) (citing WhIte, Zmmer).
See also objection letters to Newton County, Ga. (Jan. 29, 1976); Orleans Parish, La. (Aug. 15,
1975); Evangeline Parish, La., School Bd. (June 25 & July 26, 1974); Twiggs County, Ga. (Aug. 7,
1972); State of South Carolina (Mar. 6, 1972); State of Georgia (Mar. 3, 1972).
298. Objection letter to Cochise College Bd., Ariz. (Feb. 3, 1975). See also objection letters to
the State of Alabama (Aug. 2, 1982); Conecuh County, Ala. (July 26, 1982); State of New York
(June 22, 1982); State of Louisiana (June 1, 1982); Monroe, La., City School Bd. (May 18, 1982);
State of Alabama (May 6, 1982); State of Mississippi (Congress) (Mar. 30, 1982); State of Virginia
(Mar. 12, 1982); State of Arizona (Mar. 8, 1982); Uvalde County, Tex. (Feb. 18, 1982 & Jan. 22,
1982); State of Texas (Congress) (Jan. 29, 1982); State of Texas (House and Senate) (Jan. 25,
1982); State of South Carolina (House) (Nov. 18, 1981); Barbour County, Ala. (Nov. 16, 1981 &
July 21, 1981); New York, N.Y., (Oct. 27, 1981); Henry County, Ga. (May 27, 1980); Medina
County, Tex. (Apr. 14, 1978); Nueces County, Tex. (Mar. 24, 1978); Many, La. (Apr. 13, 1976);
Macon Ga. (June 13, 1975); Bronx, Kings, and New York Counties, N.Y. (Apr. 1, 1974); letter to
the State of Georgia (Dec. 18, 1973).
299. See Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1178 (D.D.C.), af'd, 439 U.S.
999 (1978) (citing City ofRichmond, 422 U.S. at 378; Nepe, 571 F.2d at 221-25). See also Donnell,
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gard traditional boundaries that could have been accommodated easily.30 0

For example, the Attorney General objected to borderline-black-majority dis-

tricts in Tate County, Mississippi that included noncontiguous areas.30 1 The

redistricting plan for the Cochise College Board, Arizona contained a district
that the Attorney General described as follows: "although geographically lo-

cated primarily in the north and center of the county, [it] now extends the
entire length of the county in siphoning off what appears to be a significant

of Spanish Surname persons located in the county's southern
concentration
30 2
extremity."

A reapportionment plan for the Louisiana House and Senate contained a

district made up of "two non-contiguous parts separated by the Mississippi
River with one situated over a mile downstream from the other." 30 3 The dis-

trict had a slim white majority, when "a logical subdivision of the northern

3 4
segment would have resulted in at least one predominantly Negro district." 0

Another district in the same plan was "an extraordinarily shaped 19-sided
figure that narrows at one point to the width of an intersection, contains por-

tions of three present districts, and suggests a design to consolidate in one
district as many black residents as possible." 30 5 The objection also noted that
30 6 Simithe "district is also over-populated . . by more than 5.5 percent."
larly, in East Feliciana Parish, Louisiana, a small all-white portion of one proposed district was located some distance from the rest of the district and was
virtually surrounded by another district which was approximately seventy perslip op. at 10; objection letters to Nacogdoches, Tex., Indep. School Dist. (Apr. 3, 1980); La Porte,
Tex. (Dec. 27, 1979).
The practice of expressly referring to invidious purpose may stem from Bolden, which required direct evidence of discriminatory purpose in constitutional vote dilution cases. See objection letters to the State of North Carolina (Senate and Congress) (Dec. 7, 198 1); Conecuh County,
Ala. (Sept. 14, 1981); Barbour County, Ala. (July 21, 1981); Batesville, Miss. (Sept. 29, 1980); Jim
Wells County, Tex. (Aug. 12, 1980); Selma, Ala. (Apr. 28, 1980) (issued six days after Bolden was
decided). See also preclearance letter to Richmond, Va. (Aug. 31, 1981). For a fuller discussion
of express references to invidious purpose after Bolden, see infra note 334 and accompanying text.
300. A redistricting plan that adheres to traditional district boundaries or otherwise attempts
to satisfy legitimate governmental goals may still be attacked if it offends more fundamental criteria. Kirklsey, 554 F.2d at 151; Robinson, 505 F.2d at 680; letter to Batesville, Miss. (Jan. 30, 1981);
objection letter to Attala County, Miss. (Sept. 3, 1974); objection letter to New Orleans, La. (July
9, 1973). See also Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484 (1968); objection letter to the State
of North Carolina (Nov. 30, 1981) (discussed supra note 294).
One objection letter states that preserving incumbents' seats may be an impermissible redistricting guideline ifmost incumbents are white. See objection letter to the State of Mississippi
(July 31, 1978). In overruling the Attorney General's objection, however, the district court stated
that incumbency may be considered "where the evidence shows incumbency concerns were not
permitted to encroach upon configurations designed to recognize and protect black voting
strength." Mirsissippi,490 F. Supp. at 583 (citing White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797 (1973); Bums
v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966)).
•301.
Objection letter to Tate County, Miss. (Nov. 28, 1972). See the discussion of borderline
majority districts, supra text accompanying notes 272-80.
302. Objection letter to Cochise College Bd., Ariz. (Feb. 3, 1975).
303. Objection letter to the State of Louisiana (Aug. 20, 1971).
304. Id
305. Id.
306. Id
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30
cent black.
The availability of alternatives will not prompt an objection merely because the result would be minority representation more closely proportional to
the minority population percentage. Consistently with the rule that proportional representation is not constitutionally required, 30 8 these objections rely
primarily on other factors that indicate vote dilution. While the objections
observe that available alternatives would yield greater proportionality, 30 9 objections of this type arise only when minorities' voting strength has been so
minimized that their exclusion from political representation may be characterized as vote dilution. 310 Similarly, recent objections to redistricting based on

307. Objection letter to East Feliciana Parish, La. (Dec. 28, 1971). See also objection letters to
Uvalde County, Tex. (Feb. 18, 1982) ("strange hourglass configuration"); Barbour County, Ala.
(Nov. 16, 1981) ("boundaries. .. are drawn in a convoluted and distorted fashion that 'carves
out' of the district virtually all-black areas while drawing into the district elsewhere two all-white
areas"); New York, N.Y. (Oct. 27, 1981) ("unusually shaped" district six miles long and, for half
ofits length, only three blocks wide); State of Virginia (House) (July 31, 1981) (combined parts of
three counties that were connected only by a two-mile stretch of river, without regard to compactness); Uvalde County, Tex. (Oct 13, 1976) ("elongated hour-glass shape of precinct"); Frio
County, Tex. (Apr. 16, 1976) ("elongated shape" of precinct); Macon, Ga. (June 13, 1975) (two
wards "oddly shaped in an elongated manner"); St. James Parish, La. (Nov. 2, 1971) (unusual
boundary line divides black population in half); State of Virginia (Senate) (May 7, 1971) (dividing
line between districts "appears contorted and does not conform to natural boundaries").
308. See the discussion of proportional representation, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
309. See, e g., objection letters to Uvalde County, Tex. (Feb. 18, 1982) (fragmentation of Mexican-American community); Jim Wells County, Tex. (Aug. 12, 1980) (dispersal of minority population); Terrell County, Tex. (Dec. 27, 1978) (dispersal of Mexican-American population);
Edwards County, Tex. (Apr. 26, 1978) (dispersal of Mexican-American population); College Park,
Ga. (Dec. 9, 1977) (underrepresentation of minority district and overloading black-majority districts); Tyler, Tex. (Feb. 25, 1976); State of Texas (Jan. 23, 1976) (dispersal of minority populations
in Jefferson and Tarrant Counties).
310. See, e.g., objection letters to Uvalde County, Tex. (Feb. 18, 1982) (55.5% Mexican-American population but "clear chance of electing a candidate of their choice. . . in only one precinct"); State of North Carolina (House) (Jan. 20, 1982) (no black representative from Greensboro
in spite of a one-third black population); Batesville, Miss. (Sept. 29, 1980) (24.8% black population
but no 60% black districts); Selma, Ala. (Apr. 28, 1980) (black population of borderline majority
district even further reduced); Medina County, Tex. (Apr. 14, 1978) (47% Mexican-American population but no Mexican-American on County Commission); Macon, Ga. (June 13, 1975) (blacks
constitute "substantial minority" but "have little chance of electing a candidate of their choice");
State of Georgia (Mar. 3, 1972) (districts have 57.2% black population but no 60% black districts);
State of Louisiana (Aug. 20, 1971) (Orleans Parish is 45% black, has 1I districts, but only one
black voting age population majority district, suggesting "a design to consolidate in one district as
many black residents as possible"). See also objection letter to Medina County, Tex. (Dec. 11,
1979).
Research reveals only one redistricting "borderline majority" objection in which minority
voters had more than minimal representation. The Attorney General objected to a plan for Bamberg County, S.C. because the effect of the plan, "against the background of racial bloc voting that
appears to exist in this county, is that while blacks comprise at least half of the voting age population and more than half of the County's total population, they will have the opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice in only two out of seven councilmanic districts." Objection letter to
Bamberg County, S.C. (July 30, 1976). Control of only two out of seven council seats may have
constituted sufficient disproportionality to prompt an objection without necessarily endorsing proportional representation. In any event, the objection was withdrawn because of "widespread support for the plan in the black community and the black victories in recent elections." Letter to
Bamberg County, S.C. (Nov. 1, 1976) (withdrawing objection of July 30, 1976).
The Attorney General in one instance may have given the appearance of requiring proportional representation when he responded to the submission of several possible redistricting proposals for Charleston, South Carolina. The city, with a 44% black population, had submitted four
plans in order of preference. The two most preferred plans provided for 12 council members
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the 1980 Census have examined whether a plan recognized the increases in

minority population since the 1970 Census. In a case involving the Texas Legislature, the Attorney General objected to "a plan in which minorities enjoy no

significant gains even though their percentage of the population has increased
and the demography of the state presents opportunities in several areas for
recognizing the increased potential of the minority community." 31 ' The objection letter was careful to emphasize, however, that minority political

strength need
not be maximized, provided that it is also not fragmented or
31 2
diluted.
E.

Minority Particpationin the RedistrictingProcess

Objections are also more likely when a plan excludes minorities from participation in the redistricting process. In 1981, the Attorney General objected
to a plan for Barbour County, Alabama because "leaders of the black community were not consulted concerning the placement of the new district lines, and
the County has provided no evidence of any systematic effort to involve blacks
in its deliberations. ' 31 3 An objection to a redistricting plan for Frio County,
Texas noted the "absence of any Mexican-American representation on the 8member reapportionment committee responsible for the plan .,,314 Similarly,
repeated objections to plans for Jim Wells County, Texas were based partly on
elected in 3 two-member districts and at-large elections for the remaining 6 council members. It
was expected that these plans would result in 2 or 4 black council members. A third plan provided
for 15 council members, 12 from single-member districts and 3 elected at-large with residency
requirements. It was expected that blacks would elect 5 council members. The Attorney General
objected to plans I through 3 and precleared plan 4, which provided for 12 council members
elected from single-member districts. Five of the 12 districts had substantital black majorities,
"thus assuring to blacks the opportunity to elect 5 of the 12 members or 41.6% of the council."
Letter to Charleston, S.C. (Feb. 18, 1975). While the Charleston objdction suggests in part that
proportionality of representation was a key factor, its outcome is probably more attributable to the
vote-dilutive devices, specifically multimember districts and at-large elections, in the rejected

plans.
The Charleston determination was probably the highwater mark for the Attorney General's
formal involvement in choosing among redistricting plans. Another objection letter has stated that
"the only function of the Attorney General is to object or approve submitted legislation and we
are not authorized nor would it be appropriate for us to recommend alternative approaches."
Objection letter to the State of Louisiana, (Aug. 20, 1971).
311. Objection letter to the State of Texas (House) (Jan. 25, 1982). See also objection letters to
Glynn County, Ga. (July 12, 1982); Dougherty County, Ga. (July 12, 1982); State of New York
(June 22, 1982); State of Texas (Senate) (Jan. 25, 1982).
312. Objection letter to the State of Texas (House) (Jan. 25, 1982). In a similar vein, the
Attorney General's objection to North Carolina's senate and congressional redistricting following
the 1980 Census noted that the black population percentage in the second congressional district,
"the only district where black voters could have the potential of electing a candidate of their
choice," had dropped in both the 1971 and 1981 reapportionments. Objection letter to the State of
North Carolina (Dec. 7, 1981).
The Attorney General's recent objection to the redistricting of the Georgia congressional
seats confirms that census-to-census changes in a particular community's demography are relevant
to an inquiry into possible vote dilution. The objection suggests that division of a growing, cohesive black community in Fulton and Dekalb Counties into two separate congressional districts was
unconstitutionally vote-dilutive. Objection letter to the State of Georgia (Feb. 11, 1982). See also
objection letter to Monroe, La., City School Bd. (May 18, 1982).
313. Objection letter to Barbour County, Ala. (July 21, 1981).
314. Objection letter to Frio County, Tex. (Apr. 16, 1976) (citing White, Robinson).
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the "conspicuous lack of input from interested members of the minority
315
community.,
Conversely, objections have been less likely when minorities participated
in the formulation of a redistricting plan. In Bamberg County, South Carolina, the Attorney General withdrew an objection based on disproportionate
underrepresentation 3 16 and racial bloc voting because of "widespread support
for the plan in the black community and the black victories in recent
31 7
elections."
F

Beer Revisited

This article has attempted to illustrate how the factors that traditionally
have governed constitutional vote dilution claims 31 8 also have dominated the
analysis of vote dilution under section 5 for each of the major types of changes
submitted for preclearance. The article also has tried to show how the Attorney General and the district court have given the retrogression test limited
application in several important cases affecting registration, polling places, atlarge elections, anti-single-shot provisions, and annexations.
In addition, the district court has twice construed the retrogression test
narrowly in the redistricting context. In Mississippi v. United States31 9 the
State of Mississippi sought preclearance for its statewide reapportionment
plan reflecting the results of the 1970 census. In applying Beer, the district
court limited the retrogression test in two significant ways. First, the court did
not use the retrogression test to compare the submission to the existing Mississippi plan, or to existing district lines as applied to current population. Instead, the court compared the submission to a 1979 court-ordered plan that
had arisen from a parallel constitutional challenge to reapportionment but had
never been implemented. 320 Similarly, in its review of Mississippi's 1981 congressional reapportionment based on the 1980 census, the district court held
that an interim plan adopted for the 1982 elections by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi would serve as the benchmark for the retrogression test. Citing its earlier decision regarding the 1970
census reapportionment in Mississippi, the court stated that "a section 5 declaratory judgment should be denied when the electoral plan under review is
retrogressive in comparison to a court-ordered plan that will be implemented
315. Objection letter to Jim Wells County, Tex. (Feb. 1, 1980). See also objection letters to the
State of Virginia (Mar. 12, 1982) ("communities were divided without significant consultation
with local minority group members"); Jim Wells County, Tex. (Aug. 12, 1980) ("no significant
input from the affected minority group"); Walthall County, Miss. (Nov. 27, 1978) ("blacks did not
participate in or were not consulted concerning the redistricting plan"); Harrison County, Tex.
(Aug. 8, 1978) ("blacks were not consulted concerning the creation of this plan"); Aransas County,
Tex. (Apr. 28, 1978) ("minorities were not consulted with respect to the creation or adoption of the
new plan").
316. See the discussion of the Bamberg County objection supra note 310.
317. Letter to Bamberg County, S.C. (Nov. 1, 1976) (withdrawing objection of July 30, 1976).
318. The most important of these factors are listed supra text accompanying notes 41-50.
319. 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979), aj'd, 444 U.S. 1050 (1980).
320. 490 F. Supp. at 580, 582. See also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
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absent approval of the statutory plan." 32 1 In this respect, both Mississippi
cases are closely related to Wilkes County, in which the district court also used
a hypothetical redistricting as the point of reference under section 5.322
The Attorney General recently adopted this flexible approach to the "status quo" and the retrogression test in two objections to redistricting plans for
Barbour County, Alabama, 32 where, citing Wilkes County, he stated, "Since
the prior plan is unconstitutionally malapportioned, our standard of comparison under Beer v. United States is 'options for properly apportioned singlemember district plans.'"324 Under the Mississippi cases and Wilkes County,
any substantial deviation from acceptable norms would trigger use of hypothetically drawn districts rather than the actual status quo. For example, a
recent objection to a redistricting plan for the New York City Council stated
that "because the existing councilmanic districts are severely malapportioned
in light of the dramatic population shifts which have occured in the last decade, we have studied possible alternative reapportionment plans faithful to
nonracial criteria." 325 These objections and declaratory judgment actions
demonstrate that even in redistricting cases the district court and the Attorney
General have restricted the retrogression test and have relied consistently on
traditional vote dilution indicators, continuing the trend of Apache County,
Wilkes County, City of Lockhart, and City of PortArthur.
More fundamentally, however, the redistricting cases and objection letters
suggest that the consistent limits on the retrogession test are justified. In the
redistricting cases, more so than in other contexts, we are reminded that the
retrogression test alone will not result in preclearance unless the submitting
jurisdiction, consistent with the second prong of Beer, also meets its burden of
proof on the constitutionality of the proposed plan. 326 Recent objections to
several redistricting plans indicate that constitutional factors are increasingly
recognized as determinative. In objecting to the reapportionments of the
South Carolina State House of Representatives, the North Carolina State Senate, and the New York City Council, the Attorney General made it plain that
each jurisdiction had to demonstrate "ata minimum" that the proposed plan
would not be retrogressive. 327 Each of these objections followed Mississippiv.
UnitedStates328 in holding that the jurisdiction must also show that the plan
321. Mississippi v. Smith, No. 82-0956, slip op. at 7-8 (D.D.C. June 28, 1982) (order denying

motion for partial summary judgment).
322. See the discussion of Wilkes County, supra text accompanying notes 138-41. See also the
discussion of the definition of status quo in City of Lockhart,supra text accompanying notes 18083.
323. Objection letters to Barbour County, Ala. (Nov. 16, 1981 & July 21, 1981).
324. Objection letter to Barbour County, Ala. (July 21, 1981) (citing Wilkes County, 450 F.
Supp. at 1178) (citations omitted). See also objection letters to Conecuh County, Ala. (July 26,
1982); Henry County, Ga. (May 27, 1980).
325. Objection letter to Bronx, Kings, and New York Counties, N.Y. (Oct. 27, 1981).
326. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
327. Objection letters to the State of North Carolina (Dec. 7, 1981); State of South Carolina
(Nov. 18, 1981); Bronx, Kings, and New York Counties, N.Y. (Oct. 27, 1981) (emphasis added).
See also objection letter to Williamsburg County, S.C. (Aug. 20, 1982).
328. 490 F. Supp. at 581.
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"fairly reflects" minority voting power. More explicitly, the Attorney General
objected to the 1982 reapportionment of Georgia's congressional districts relying on constitutional vote dilution factors, even after he first found that "the
plan must be considered one which 'enhances the position of minorities in
respect to their effective exercise of the election franchise.' ",329 Each of these
objectiotis stated constitutionality as the relevant standard and then proceeded
to deny preclearance by citing factors that typically determine the outcome in
constitutional racial or ethnic reapportionment litigation, such as fragmentation of minority communities, multimember districts, and the like.
The most recent manifestation of this trend is the district court's opinion
in Busbee v. Smith,33 0 which was a declaratory judgment action filed by the
State of Georgia following the Attorney General's objection to the 1982 Georgia reapportionment. Citing the requirement in Mississipi v. United States
that a reapportionment plan must "fairly reflect" the strength of minority voting power, 33 1 the court brushed aside as insufficient the argument that the
proposed plan would not be retrogressive. The court then relied explicitly on
the constitutionality prong of Beer to deny preclearance. In so doing, the
court relied on a number of familiar factors: (1) fragmentation of the large
and contiguous black population in metropolitan Atlanta; (2) past discrimination; (3) absence of a legitimate, nonracial reason for the plan; and (4) overt
332
expressions of racial animus.

While this trend toward explicit reliance on the constitutionality prong
has become more noticeable in these recent redistricting objections, earlier objections also avoided the retrogression test altogether by relying on the unconstitutionality of the proposal. For example, a 1978 objection to a redistricting
plan for Nueces County, Texas found that the plan was not retrogressive but
that the county had not met its burden of showing constitutionality. 333
Changes in the language of objection letters following the Supreme Court's
Bolden decision also suggest reliance on the constitutionality prong of Beer.
As soon as Bolden was decided, the Attorney General's objections began to
refer specifically to the discriminatory purpose that, according to Bolden, was
necessary to a finding of unconstitutionality. 334
329. Objection letter to the State of Georgia (Feb. 11, 1982). Of course, the district court and
the Attorney General have continued to rely on the retrogression test when it indicates that an
objection is appropriate wholly apart from constitutional factors. See, e.g., Hale County, 496 F.
Supp. at 1216-17; objection letter to Monroe, La., City School Bd. (May 18, 1982); objection letter
to the State of Alabama (May 6, 1982).
330. No. 82-0665,(D.D.C. July 22, 1982).
331. No. 82-0665, slip op. at 56.
332. Id at 52-56. At first glance, the court's opinion appears to equate the constitutionality
test in Beer with the "purpose" standard set forth in the Act and leaves ambiguous which of the
two standards is analytically significant. As the opinion is constructed, however, the court could

only have taken the view that a covercd change would have to satisfy the constitutionality test in

Beer even absent a "purpose" test in § 5.
333. Objection letter to Nueces County, Tex. (Mar. 24, 1978).
334. See objection letter to Selma, Ala. (Apr. 28, 1980) (issued six days after Bolden). See also
objection letters to Conecuh County, Ala. (Sept. 14, 1981); Barbour County, Ala. (July 21, 1981);
Batesville, Miss. (Sept. 29, 1980); Jim Wells County, Tex. (Aug. 12, 1980). Each of these letters
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In sum, although patterns specific to particular types of changes have
evolved, the indicators of vote dilution taken from constitutional cases, together with the statutory shift in the burden of proof to the submitting jurisdiction, have emerged as the critical factors in decisions under section 5. As
compared with these factors, the retrogression prong of the Beer analysis has
had relatively little impact on the development of the substantive law of sec-

tion 5.335
VII.

CONCLUSION

By discussing the four basic types of section 5 submissions, this article has
sought, initially, to place the over eight hundred objections interposed by the
Attorney General into an orderly framework for present and future analysis.
Beyond this, the article has sought to demonstrate that section 5 jurisprudence
has been characterized by a struggle with Beer v. United States. In dealing
with Beer, the key question has been the extent to which the retrogression test
has proved to be the determinative inquiry. The answer provided by the district court and the Attorney General generally has been that the retrogression
test in Beer is only part of the analysis. First, the "status quo" has emerged as
a flexible concept that has yielded to vote dilution indicators from constitutional cases when the status quo either has been difficult to ascertain or itself
arguably vote-dilutive. Second, and more importantly, even when the status
quo has not presented analytic problems, the district court and the Attorney
General appear to have accepted the invitation in the second prong of Beerto consider constitutional factors drawn from fourteenth and fifteenth amendment vote 'dilution cases.
Thus, while acting consistently with Beer, the courts and the Attorney
General appear to have discovered that Beer provides the starting point for
analysis, but little more. As a result, the pattern of decisions under section 5
reveals heavy reliance on the indicators of vote dilution that have developed in
constitutional litigation based on the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
This development has occurred in a manner that reflects adherence to the dictates of Beer taken as a whole. Because the burden of proving constitutionality in section 5 cases is on the jurisdiction, the district court and the Attorney
General can consider constitutional vote dilution indicators and block a submitted change without necessarily deciding that the same change would be
held unconstitutional in fourteenth or fifteenth amendment litigation. At the
cites Wilkes County, 450 F. Supp. at 1178, for the inference of discriminatory purpose. See also
preclearance letter to Richmond, Va. (Aug. 31, 1981).
335. Compare the pie-Beer objections in objection letters to St. James Parish, Lousiana (Nov.
2, 1971) [and] Clarke County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. (Aug. 6, 1971) with objection letters to Jim Wells
County, Tex. (Feb. 1, 1980); [and] objection letter to Uvalde County, Tex. (Oct. 13, 1976); [and]
objection letter to Waller County, Tex. (July 27, 1976); [and] objection letter to Crockett County,
Tex. (July 7, 1976) [and] letter to Crockett County, Tex. (Nov. 9, 1977); [and] objection letter to
Frio County, Tex. (Apr. 16, 1976). The Attorney General's withdrawal of his objection to at-large
elections with a majority vote requirement and numbered posts in Fulton County, Georgia is a
rare case of an objection withdrawn in explicit reliance on Beer. Letter to Fulton County, Ga.
(July 2, 1976) (withdrawing objection of May 22, 1974).
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same time, in drawing on these factors, the substantive law under section 5
generally has reflected a fundamental faithfulness to the basic underpinning of
both section 5 and the constitutional law of vote dilution-equality of access
to the political process.

